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Adaptive Governance of
Modern Wicked Problems
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Lance Gunderson****
In the twenty-first century, our planet is facing a period of rapid and
fundamental change resulting from human domination so extensive it is
expected to be visible in the geologic record. The accelerating rate of change
compounds the global social-ecological challenges already deemed “wicked” due
to conflicting goals and scientific uncertainty. Understanding how connected
natural and human systems respond to change is essential to understanding
the governance required to navigate these modern wicked problems. This Article
views change through the lens of complexity and resilience theories to inform
the challenges of governance in a world dominated by such massive and
relentless disruption.
The new theories of governance discussed in this Article have been
developed through empirical observation of emerging governance innovation to
fill governance gaps that have opened with the increasing complexity of society.
Among them, adaptive governance has been described as emerging in
environmental governance and described in the resilience literature as a
promising means to manage modern wicked problems. Adaptive governance is
observed to emerge, and does so, in situations of conflict with high uncertainty
in environmental management outcomes.
This Article contributes to the development of adaptive governance
theory by articulating and situating the role of formal law and government as
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the facilitator, but not central controller, of adaptive governance. To advance
the understanding of adaptive governance, we argue that it can be understood
in the broader context of scholarship covering the observed emergence of new
governance, the efforts to develop theoretical understandings through
decentered theory, and the refinement of constitutional understanding through
democratic experimentalism. Synthesis of these three themes in turn informs
the role of law and government in working with emergent governance responses
to complexity to manage change and wicked problems. This inter- and
transdisciplinary exercise reveals that the role of law and government in
adaptive governance is to leave space for local innovation and private
governance. Law and government must provide the catalyzation, facilitation,
steering, and oversight essential for public and private institutions to respond
at the rate and complexity of change in large-scale social-ecological systems,
and they must do so while advancing good governance.†
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INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Rittel and Webber1 used the term “wicked” to describe
value-laden problems in which goal formation, problem definition, and
equitable solution options are contested. Objective application of
expertise alone cannot solve a wicked problem.2 In working with the list
of attributes of wicked problems Rittel and Webber identified,3 which
has become “rooted in many research fields,”4 it is important to
understand that their conceptualization arose in the planning context
(e.g., how to design the transit system for a major city) during the social
upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s.5 At the time, general systems theory,
which emphasizes explaining complex patterns or behaviors that arise
from interactions of key system components,6 was coming of age to
address environmental problems, but it either received little
application or was rejected by the social and political sciences.7 Modern
complex environmental problems, such as climate change, share the
core attributes Rittel and Webber described but also include elements
of rapid social change and increasing complexity as societies enter the
age of globalization, the digital revolution, and human domination of

1.
Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POL’Y SCIS. 155, 160 (1973).
2.
Id. at 156.
3.
Id. at 161–66:
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem . . . 2. Wicked problems have
no stopping rule . . . 3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-orbad . . . 4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked
problem . . . 5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation”; because
there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts
significantly . . . 6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or exhaustively
desirable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible
operations that may be incorporated into the plan . . . 7. Every wicked problem is
essentially unique . . . 8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of
another problem . . . 9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem
can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature
of the problem’s resolution . . . 10. The planner has no right to be wrong.
4.
Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Art Dewulf & Robbert Biesbroek, A Critical Assessment of the
Wicked Problem Concept: Relevance and Usefulness for Policy Science and Practice, 38 POL’Y &
SOC’Y 167, 168 (2019).
5.
Kate Crowley & Brian W. Head, The Enduring Challenge of ‘Wicked Problems’: Revisiting
Rittel and Webber, 50 POL’Y SCIS. 539, 541 (2017).
6.
LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT,
APPLICATIONS 3–5 (1968); see also Ralph H. Abraham, The Genesis of Complexity, 67 WORLD
FUTURES 380, 380–84 (2011) (detailing the roots of complexity theory).
7.
See B. Guy Peters, What Is So Wicked About Wicked Problems? A Conceptual Analysis
and a Research Program, 36 POL’Y & SOC’Y 385, 385 (2017) (noting that the Rittel and Webber
article served as a precursor for the development of complexity theories in the social sciences).
Note that systems-related theories of complexity, adaptation, and resilience will be discussed in
greater detail in Part I.
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the planet.8 In taking the efforts to address wicked problems from a
planning perspective to much broader governance realms, it is clear
that the core attributes Rittel and Webber outlined, combined with an
accelerated rate of change, high uncertainty, and a timeframe that
implicates intergenerational equity, compound the lack of fit between
traditional governance and the challenges it is intended to manage. The
development of systems approaches, such as complexity and resilience
theory from biophysical sciences, has challenged the social sciences to
update their models, leading to reconceptualization of these “modern”
wicked problems.
In a growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship that bridges
biophysical and social sciences in addressing environmental issues, the
evidence of emergence of adaptive governance has been described and
offered as a promising means to manage modern wicked problems. Here
we use governance as a broad term that includes, but goes beyond,
government. As political scientist Mark Bevir defines these terms,
“Whereas government refers to political institutions, governance refers
to processes of rule wherever they occur.”9 Thus, governance includes
private as well as public action, with formal law and government being
only a subset of governance. What separates adaptive governance from
other strands of governance theory is the realization that wicked
problems are changing in their dynamics at accelerating rates and with
increasingly uncertain futures. Consequently, governance must not
only rely on institutions beyond government, it must do so adaptively.
8.
See Will Steffen, Paul J. Crutzen & John R. McNeill, The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now
Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?, 36 AMBIO 614 (2007) (discussing human domination of
Earth’s systems in the context of the geologic record).
9.
MARK BEVIR, GOVERNANCE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3 (2012) [hereinafter BEVIR,
GOV. INTRO]; see also MARK BEVIR, A THEORY OF GOVERNANCE 17 (2013) [hereinafter BEVIR,
THEORY GOV.] (the author is the leading expert on the increasing emergence of non-government
centered governance in Western democracies); MARK BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS IN GOVERNANCE 3
(2009) [hereinafter BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS] (describing the key aspects of governance). For the
definition used in the AWG Project see Barbara Cosens & Lance Gunderson, An Introduction to
Practical Panarchy, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY FOR ADAPTIVE WATER GOVERNANCE: LINKING LAW
TO S OCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILLIENCE 1, 3 (Barbara Cosens & Lance Gunderson eds., 2018)
[hereinafter PRACTICAL PANARCHY]. See, e.g., PETER ROGERS & ALAN W HALL, GLOB. WATER P’SHIP
TECH. COMM., EFFECTIVE WATER GOVERNANCE 4 (2003), http://www.gwp.org/Global/ToolBox/
Publications/Background%20papers/07%20Effective%20Water%20Governance%20%282003%29
%20English.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X68-RA6P] (“Governance generally involves mediating
behaviour via values, norms, and, where possible, through laws.”). See GOVERNANCE FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009) (noting that
the demand for governance is increasing at the same time that confidence in governments to
provide such is waning); UNITED NATIONS SYS. TASK TEAM, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T ECON. & SOC.
AFFS., U NITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME & UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., UN
SYSTEM TASK TEAM ON THE POST-2015 UN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT (2012), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20Pieces/7_governance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TN5F-WVTB] (describing governance as the means through which collective
goals are chosen, decisions are made, and action is taken to achieve the chosen goals).
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Adaptive governance theory developed to make sense of emerging forms
of environmental governance responding to complexity and to help
conceptualize how society can grow more nimble in the face of the
daunting social-ecological changes ahead.
This Article contributes to the development of adaptive
governance theory by articulating and situating the role of formal law
and government within the broader enterprise of governance and by
discussing the key implications of complexity and resilience theories for
governance in general and for law in particular. We make three core
arguments. First, conceptualizing modern wicked problems requires a
firm understanding of theories that arose from the study of complex
systems, characterized by high levels of interacting variables,
nonlinearity, and deep uncertainty. Second, adaptive governance is an
emergent, context-specific response in complex systems that fosters
distributed governance, embraces democratic experimentalism to
generate an ever-broadening realm of governance processes and actors,
and increases the capacity of society to manage change and uncertainty
in complex social-ecological systems. Third, to take advantage of this
emergent response of society to complexity, the role of formal law and
government is not one of central controller, but rather one of facilitator,
which requires law and government themselves to be adaptive.
Our discussion proceeds in three parts corresponding to our core
arguments. Part I explores why the unique attributes of this time in
history call for new approaches to governance of wicked problems,
arguing that the science of complexity, as incorporated into resilience
theory, informs how best to conceptualize the governance challenge.
Part II reviews the history of scholarship on emergence of governance
innovation in Western democracies since the 1980s, which has led to
increasingly distributed governance with both private and public actors
playing significant roles. The discussion focuses on how the progression
of governance experiments demonstrates patterns that reflect aspects
of complexity and resilience theory. It then turns to the trends in
empirical work, scholarship, and practice in environmental governance
that led to the initial observation of emergence of a new form of
governance, from which the broader concept of adaptive governance was
developed. Finally, Part III seeks to inform the development of adaptive
governance through a synthetic understanding of complexity and
governance and to consider the efficacy of this approach in the face of
growing complexity of wicked problems. While emerging approaches to
distributed governance are promising for managing resilience, they are
not emerging fast enough to address accelerating change, and they are
proceeding ahead and outside of governmental checks on good
governance, including legitimacy, transparency, accountability, equity,
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and justice. To address this gap, Part III concludes by analyzing the
governmental role in accelerating emergence of adaptive governance
and calling for legal authority and government leadership to act in both
a facilitative role and as the arbiter of good governance.
I. ACCELERATING CHANGE
The forms of governance discussed in this paper are emerging to
fill gaps related to the increasing complexity of society. Governance
gaps in areas that include climate change, globalized economies, and
landscape-scale ecosystem and water basin management exist and are
widening as the complexity of interrelated social, ecological, and
technological systems accelerates.10 Understanding how systems
respond to change is therefore essential to understanding the
governance required to navigate that change.
Throughout geologic time, the planet Earth has experienced
punctuated change. While the scale of geologic time may spread change
over millennia, rendering it invisible on a human time scale, the
geologic record displays change in relatively abrupt cycles visible today
in unconformities, record sea level and climate change, and mass
extinctions.11 In the twenty-first century, the planet is in a period of
change expected to be visible in the geologic record, occurring on a
human time scale, and resulting from human domination of the earth.
Both the geologic12 and the popular or policy literature13 refer to this
10. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 8–16 (2017) (discussing governance gaps in
climate change); Barbara A. Cosens, Lance Gunderson & Brian C. Chaffin, Introduction to the
Special Feature Practicing Panarchy: Assessing Legal Flexibility, Ecological Resilience, and
Adaptive Governance in Regional Water Systems Experiencing Rapid Environmental Change, 23
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2018, at 4–8, https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09524-230104 [https://perma.cc/
N2K8-4KJ4] (PDF download available at URL provided) (discussing governance gaps in landscape
scale ecosystems and water basins); Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing, Changes in
Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 41 (2008)
(discussing governance gaps in globalized economies).
11. Unconformity: a vertical section of rock in which the contact line between rocks below and
above reflects a gap in time—these represent significant geologic events in Earth’s history.
Extinctions: a significant change in biodiversity and species present. EDWARD J. TARBUCK &
FREDERICK K. LUTGENS, EARTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL GEOLOGY 251, 598, 619 (9th
ed. 2008).
12. Colin N. Waters, Jan Zalasiewicz, Colin Summerhayes, Anthony D. Barnosky, Clément
Poirier, Agnieszka Gałuszka, Alejandro Cearreta, Matt Edgeworth, Erle C. Ellis, Michael Ellis,
Catherine Jeandel, Reinhold Leinfelder, J.R. McNeill, Daniel deB. Richter, Will Steffen, James
Syvitski, Davor Vidas, Michael Wagreich, Mark Williams, An Zhisheng, Jacques Grinevald, Eric
Odada, Naomi Oreskes & Alexander P. Wolfe, The Anthropocene Is Functionally and
Stratigraphically Distinct from the Holocene, 351 SCIENCE 137, 137 (2016).
13. Steffen et al., supra note 8, at 614; Will Steffen, Åsa Persson, Lisa Deutsch, Jan
Zalasiewicz, Mark Williams, Katherine Richardson, Carole Crumley, Paul Crutzen, Carl Folke,
Line Gordon, Mario Molina, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Johan Rockström, Marten Scheffer,
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epoch as the Anthropocene. Scientists limit their identification of the
new epoch to those things known to be present globally over the surface
of the earth, including fly ash, plastics, nuclear fallout, habitat loss,
invasive species, and climate change as recorded in changing sea levels
and biodiversity.14 The popular literature would add that the planet is
currently undergoing loss of biodiversity at a rate that is equal to or
exceeds that of the five other mass extinctions in the 3.5 billion year
geologic record of life on Earth,15 and it is approaching other planetary
boundaries involving biogeochemical cycling.16
What is truly unique about the Anthropocene is that global
environmental change coincides with accelerating rates of change in
social systems—namely, globalization, the digital revolution, and
population growth neatly characterized as the Great Acceleration.17
Thus, the utility of understanding the complex response of systems to
disturbance is to inform how society might navigate accelerating
change on a human timescale. This Section explores the science that
informs understanding of complex systems and how systems facing
change evolve.

Hans Joachim Schellnhuber & Uno Svedin, The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary
Stewardship, 40 AMBIO 739, 739 (2011); MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE END
OF S USTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE 1 (2017); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THANK YOU FOR BEING LATE: AN OPTIMIST’S
GUIDE TO THRIVING IN THE AGE OF ACCELERATIONS 187–88 (Picador 2017) (2016); ELIZABETH
KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 107 (2014).
14. Waters et al., supra note 12, at 137.
15. KOLBERT, supra note 13, at 15–16. Note that despite the preference of environmentalists
the International Stratigraphy Commission Working Group on the Anthropocene cannot yet
determine if this will show in the geologic record; however, to the extent that it is the result of loss
of habitat, it is included in their basis for epoch recommendation. Working Grp. on the
‘Anthropocene’, Results of Binding Vote by AWG Released 21st May 2019, SUBCOMM. ON
QUATERNARY STRATIGRAPHY, http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/anthropocene/
(last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/2KN5-PJKX]; see also Damian Carrington, The
Anthropocene Epoch: Scientists Declare Dawn of Human-Influenced Age, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29,
2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/29/declare-anthropoceneepoch-experts-urge-geological-congress-human-impact-earth
[https://perma.cc/ZA5N-WJHH]
(discussing the debate surrounding designation of the epoch).
16. Steffen et al., supra note 8, at 615; Steffen et al., supra note 13, at 753–54; Will Steffen,
Katherine Richardson, Johan Rockström, Sarah E. Cornell, Ingo Fetzer, Elena M. Bennett,
Reinette Biggs, Stephen R. Carpenter, Wim de Vries, Cynthia A. de Wit, Carl Folke, Dieter Gerten,
Jens Heinke, Georgina M. Mace, Linn M. Persson, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Belinda Reyers &
Sverker Sörlin, Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet, 347
SCIENCE 736, 736 (2015).
17. Steffen et al., supra note 8, at 617; Steffen et al., supra note 13, at 743; FRIEDMAN, supra
note 13, at 254 (placing the inflection point in accelerating change at 2007).
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A. The Twentieth-Century Scientific Revolution
in the Study of Complex Systems
The Anthropocene unfolded in concert with a scientific
revolution in which understanding of planetary processes reached a
level that allowed scientists not only to identify the global imprint of
human activities but to begin to understand consequences of those
activities. Various approaches, such as general systems theory, 18
complexity theory,19 and resilience theory,20 were developed to help
recognize and understand patterns of change across a range of systems.
These three theories in particular also helped provide a basis for
translating knowledge to action in environmental systems. In cases
that link environmental and economic systems (such as fisheries
management),21 understanding system behavior is vital to governing
human interventions. We argue that governance and design of
governmental structures and processes can be informed by
understanding the behavior of systems from these different
theoretical perspectives.
Systems can be characterized in a myriad of ways, but a
distinction between simple and complicated systems on one hand and
complex systems on the other offers a valuable starting point for
understanding them.22 In studying a simple system, such as a
mechanical clock, you find a limited number of levers, pulleys, and pins
that operate under a specific set of rules (laws of motion) and produce a
rather standardized outcome (hands moving clockwise at a regular
pace). The system may be complicated in the number of components and
their interactions, but the operation of the system can be understood
and predicted once all the components and their mechanics have been
mapped out.23 Complex systems, such as tropical rainforests, oceans,
societies, or the global economy are a stark contrast in comparison. In

18. See FRITJOF CAPRA & PIER LUIGI LUISI, THE SYSTEMS VIEW OF LIFE: A UNIFYING VISION
(2014) (discussing systems theory).
19. VON BERTALANFFY, supra note 6, at 34; see also Abraham, supra note 6, at 380–84
(detailing the history and origins of complexity theory).
20. See C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 1, 1–23 (1973) (using mathematical formulations to describe interaction in
ecosystems and developing resilience theory to describe the results of adaptation and regime shift).
21. See Barbara Cosens & Alexander Fremier, Assessing System Resilience and Ecosystem
Services in Large River Basins: A Case Study of the Columbia River Basin, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 91
(2014) (applying resilience theory to the complex tradeoffs between salmon and hydropower in the
Columbia River to understand system adaptive capacity and the potential for tipping points).
22. PAUL CILLIERS, COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM: UNDERSTANDING COMPLEX SYSTEMS
2–3 (1998); JOHN H. HOLLAND, COMPLEXITY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3–4 (2014).
23. HOLLAND, supra note 22, at 4–5.
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addition to being complicated, these systems are also complex. The
distinction goes to the essence of complexity science theory:
In a complicated world, the various elements that make up the system maintain a degree
of independence from one another. Thus, removing one such element (which reduces the
level of complication) does not fundamentally alter the system’s behavior apart from that
which directly resulted from the piece that was removed. Complexity arises when the
dependencies among the elements become important. In such a system, removing one
such element destroys system behavior to an extent that goes well beyond what is
embodied by the particular element that is removed. 24

Systems thinking is based on this understanding of complexity
in systems. Systems thinking arose in the first half of the twentieth
century out of the study of living systems and the recognition of
patterns arising from interactions that are not present in the
reductionist study of the components alone. 25 It represented a
revolution in Western science, and this approach has been
used in the application of scientific understanding to real world
management issues.26
Systems science began to flourish in the 1950s with the
development of general systems theories and methods (such as
mathematical modeling, measurements, and experiments) to test those
theories. Biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy developed systems models to
reconcile paradoxes between physical system rules (such as the laws of
thermodynamics) and living systems. 27 Beginning in the 1960s,
mathematical modeling through the use of computer technology began
to reveal the complexity of systems,28 allowing scientists “to discover
order beneath the seeming chaos.”29 Such an approach provided
systems scientists a framework to help explain patterns in nature but
also to generate alternative methods to evaluate, reject, and replace
24. JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 9 (2007). Thus “work is needed on distinguishing the
complex . . . from the just complicated in the presence of many possible explanatory models and
imperfect data.” Nicholas W. Watkins & Mervyn P. Freeman, Natural Complexity, 320 SCIENCE
323, 324 (2008).
25. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 4.1.
26. Id.; see also Robin Kundis Craig, Resilience Theory and Wicked Problems, 73 VAND. L.
REV. 1733 (2020) (noting that Rittel and Webber’s conceptualization of wicked problems, while
focused on a more linear scientific understanding of natural systems, takes a step toward systems
thinking by acknowledging the open and interacting nature of natural systems).
27. VON BERTALANFFY, supra note 6, at 39–41; see also CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 5.2.
The work notes that the development by Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine of an approach to complex
mathematics in application to non-equilibrium thermodynamics of chemical systems allowed this
advance. Id. Prigogine was able to show that while non-equilibrium, open systems tended toward
increasing order and complexity, the dissipation of energy and matter in that process had an
overall result of increasing entropy, thus maintaining consistency with the second law of
thermodynamics. Id.
28. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 6.
29. Id. § 6.3.1, at 109.
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theories within the systems paradigm. Hence, complexity theory was
developed to account for increasing numeric complexity in systems (i.e.,
number of components or variables and complexity attributed to
nonlinear relationships among components).30
Resilience theory was first proposed by C.S. (Buzz) Holling,31 who
applied systems theory to the field of ecology.32 Holling developed new
and novel mathematical models to describe predation in the 1960s. He
discovered that simple predator/prey models generated oscillations
around a stable equilibrium for a wide range of organisms and
ecosystems. Such systems may fluctuate substantially (generate
dynamic behavior) around an equilibrium due to nonlinear
relationships and feedbacks among components. By the 1970s he began
creating more complex models to include other factors such as more
predators, external disturbances (such as disease), or changes in food
availability or nutrition.33 As he increased the complexity of the model
system, he noted unexpected outcomes. His results indicated that
changes in system controls, both external (food availability) and
internal (feedbacks), would result in different system configurations. In
other words, a disturbance to a system may cause that system to cross
a threshold into a qualitatively different regime or state characterized
by different structures and functions, which in turn are maintained by
feedbacks. He called this phenomenon a system “flip” and used the word
resilience to describe the process that mediates the transition or flip.34
Once a threshold is crossed, a system may or may not return to the prior

30. Id. § 6 (noting that complexity theory is also referred to as “nonlinear systems theory”
and “dynamical systems theory,” and that chaos theory and fractal geometry are branches of
complexity theory). Importantly, Capra and Luisi are quick to note that a mathematical theory is
not the same as a scientific theory, which is developed through observation and experimentation,
but instead represents a means of qualitatively depicting patterns. Id. As will be discussed,
resilience theory developed first through mathematical modeling (i.e., complexity theory) and grew
as empirical evidence supported the patterns discovered. An excellent example of this process of
modeling followed by empirical proof in the popular press is the recent picture of a black hole
predicted by Einstein’s mathematical theory of relativity. Shep Doeleman, Focus on the First Event
Horizon Telescope Results, IOP: IOPSCIENCE (Apr. 2019), https://iopscience.iop.org/journal/20418205/page/Focus_on_EHT [https://perma.cc/T5H2-4FGF].
31. Holling, supra note 20, at 1–23; Lance H. Gunderson, C.S. Holling, Lowell Pritchard Jr.
& Garry D. Peterson, Resilience of Large-Scale Resource Systems, in RESILIENCE AND THE
BEHAVIOR OF LARGE-SCALE SYSTEMS 3, 4 (Lance H. Gunderson & Lowell Pritchard Jr. eds., 2002).
32. Ecology arose as a separate field of study in the late nineteenth century when biologists
began to study the relations among living organisms and their environment. CAPRA & LUISI, supra
note 18, § 4.1.5.
33. Holling, supra note 20, at 1–23 (discussing and illustrating some of those more complex
models); Carl Folke, Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social–Ecological Systems
Analyses, 16 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 253, 254 (2006) (quoting C.S. Holling).
34. Holling, supra note 20, at 15–19.
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state.35 This recognition of nonlinear behavior became a key component
of resilience theory, as described by Holling:
Once discovered it was obvious that conditions for multi-stable states were inevitable.
And that, being inevitable, there were huge consequences for theory and practice. Single
equilibria and global stability had made ecology focus on near equilibria behavior, ﬁxed
carrying capacity with a goal of minimizing variability. The multi-stable state reality
opened an entirely different focus on behavior far from equilibrium and on stability
boundaries. High variability became an attribute to maintain existence and
learning. Surprise and inherent unpredictability was the inevitable consequence for
ecological systems. 36

The propositions of Holling’s resilience theory made in the early
1970s were debated in the ecological literature; the main critique being
a lack of empirical support. By the 1990s, however, empirical evidence
of regime shifts in ecosystems such as coral reefs, lakes, and grasslands,
all of which had been subjected to extensive human actions, was
mounting. Evidence of the existence of multiple stable states in
ecosystems is now substantial.37
Holling’s work shares many of the attributes and relies on the
same developments in mathematics and computing as complexity
theory and, as such, enabled the expansion and testing of resilience
theory in other disciplinary fields (such as economics, anthropology, and
political science) that focus on various ways humans interact with
ecosystems.38 Similar to systems thinking, resilience theory focuses on

35. Id.; C.S. Holling, Engineering Resilience Versus Ecological Resilience, in ENGINEERING
WITHIN ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS 31, 31–32 (Peter C. Schulze ed., 1996); Marten Scheffer, Steve
Carpenter, Jonathan A. Foley, Carl Folke & Brian Walker, Catastrophic Shifts in Ecosystems, 413
NATURE 591, 591 (2001); PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL
SYSTEMS (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002) [hereinafter PANARCHY]; Brian Walker,
C.S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter & Ann Kinzig, Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability
in Social–Ecological Systems, 9 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2004, at 1, 2, https://www.ecologyand
society.org/vol9/iss2/art5/print.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAM4-KR24]; BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT,
RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 58 (2006).
36. Folke, supra note 33, at 254 (quoting C.S. Holling).
37. Id. at 256–57.
38. See Simon A. Levin, Scott Barrett, Sara Aniyar, William Baumol, Christopher Bliss, Bert
Bolin, Partha Dasgupta, Paul Ehrilich, Carl Folke, Ing-Marie Gren, C.S. Holling, AnnMari
Jansson, Bengt-Owe Jansson, Karl-Göran Mäler, Dan Martin, Charles Perrings & Eytan
Sheshinski, Resilience in Natural and Socioeconomic Systems, 3 ENV’T & DEV. ECONS. 222, 225–
36 (1998) (applying resilience theory to economic systems). It is interesting to note that in a 1999
book, Simon Levin used complex adaptive systems theory to analyze and inform ecosystem
management and viewed adaptive management as an appropriate response to the unpredictable
behavior of ecosystems, without acknowledging the link between Holling’s alternative ecological
regimes and adaptive management. See SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND
THE COMMONS 199 (1999). Levin’s work equates the term “resilience” with “resistance” rather than
Holling’s recognition that adaptive capacity and resistance play a role in maintaining a particular
state, and his inclusion of the existence of alternative stable states and the possibility of regime
shift as part of resilience theory. Id. at 173 n.58. While both the work of Holling and of Levin
inform this article, it will rely on the definitions and the line of literature stemming from Holling,
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the processes controlling interaction of system components as opposed
to the components themselves. Holling further emphasized the
difference between “engineering resilience,” focused on the resistance of
a static system to change and its return time to an equilibrium state
following a disturbance,39 and “ecological resilience,” focused on “the
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while
undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function,
structure, identity, and feedbacks.”40 Importantly, ecological resilience
theory is an application of complexity theory and shares its
understanding of the emergent properties associated with the
interaction of system components.
B. Complexity as Context for Governance
Although their article is famous for its description of wicked
problems as a category, Rittel and Webber developed the category to
explain why governance at the time in the United States and other
Western democratic nations was undergoing a transition from relying
on rationalist expertise for problem solving to a far more pluralistic
environment in which social goals and problem definition were highly
contested.41 Central to their theme was the growing complexity of social
problems, which in their view were increasingly operating in “large and
interconnected networks of systems.” 42 The governance challenge they
identified from this growing complexity was that “any solution, after
being implemented, will generate waves of consequences,” some of
which could “yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh
the intended advantages” of the solution.43 In such an environment,
social problems are no longer solved—they are, at best, managed well.
Although Rittel and Webber were writing before complexity
science developed the model of complex systems, their conception of
wicked problems captures many of its themes, and scholarship on
wicked problems theory has increasingly turned to complexity science
supra note 20, to understand resilience theory in ecology and consider its implications
for governance.
39. Holling, supra note 35, at 33.
40. Walker et al., supra note 35, at 2; see also Holling, supra note 20 (introducing the concept
of ecological resilience); Lance H. Gunderson, Ecological Resilience—in Theory and Application,
31 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY, EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 425 (2000) (discussing ecological resilience);
PANARCHY, supra note 35 (same); Gunderson et al., supra note 31 (same); Lance Gunderson &
Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management and Adaptive Governance in the Everglades Ecosystem,
39 POL’Y SCIS. 323, 324 (2006) (same); Folke, supra note 33, at 253–55 (same); WALKER & SALT,
supra note 35, at 1 (same).
41. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 155–59.
42. Id. at 159.
43. Id. at 163.
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as an important source of understanding.44 Indeed, if anything, social
problems have only grown more complex, at faster rates, since Rittel
and Webber developed the concept of wicked problems. Hence, at this
time when governance confronts accelerating change across
geographical scales and different social-ecological systems, seven
related features of complex systems are driving forces behind modern
wicked problems: (1) self-organization; (2) emergence; (3) networks; (4)
feedback; (5) nonlinearity and tipping points; (6) cross-scale
interactions; and (7) uncertainty.45 Relying on the literature on
complexity theory and resilience, we expand on these seven features to
demonstrate the challenges they present for governance.
(1) Self-organization. Structures and functions in complex
systems arise or emerge through a process called self-organization.46
One of the mysteries of self-organization is that systems can develop
towards stable regimes without an identified designer or controller.
Self-organization leads to ecosystems characterized as forests or
physical systems such as tropical cyclones.47
Markets are good examples of self-organization within a system
of governance. The combined results of many individual decisions to buy
and sell goods and services without external coordination leads to the
emergence of markets, which generate economic stability as a result of
the interaction between supply and demand, as well as efficient
distribution of capital over large geographic scales.48 Nobel Laureate
Elinor Ostrom used the term “self-organization” to describe the coming
together of individuals in a community to solve a common problem of
allocation of common pool resources without a regulatory mandate from
government.49 Indeed, “[o]ne of the most significant challenges for
adaptive governance is to develop social contexts and legal structures
44. Brian W. Head, Forty Years of Wicked Problems Literature: Forging Closer Links to Policy
Studies, 38 POL’Y & SOC’Y 180, 191 (2019); Brian W. Head & John Alford, Wicked Problems:
Implications for Public Policy and Management, 47 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 711, 724 (2015).
45. See J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal
Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 229–31 (2015) (focusing on emergence, feedback and selforganization as attributes of complexity recognized in legal systems).
46. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 5.3.5; Gunderson, supra note 40, at 430; Holling, supra
note 20.
47. See CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 8.1.1 (defining self-organization as processes that
occur spontaneously without an external controller, and providing examples of several biological
processes that are self-organizing).
48. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1910) (1776) (arguing that free (i.e. unregulated) markets will provide
greater prosperity).
49. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (1990); Fabien Locher, Historicizing Elinor Ostrom: Urban Politics,
International Development and Expertise in the U.S. Context (1970-1990), 19 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 533, 543 (2018).
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that can support adaptation without stifling the potential for
self-organization.”50
(2) Emergence. Emergence describes the presence of novel
system properties that arise from interactions (i.e., self-organization)
among the components of a system.51 In complexity theory, emergence
corresponds to a sudden appearance of order in a system following a
period of instability52 and is of critical importance in the scientific
understanding of life.53 Emergence is the phenomenon referred to by
the phrase: “[T]he whole is greater [or other] than the sum of the
parts,”54 meaning that interacting components within the system
produce patterns or regularities that cannot be understood through
study of the components.
Importantly, emergence is context specific. Similar systems in a
slightly different setting or with a slightly different mix of components
may show different emergent properties when disturbed. While
patterns in similar systems repeat, and the study of one ecosystem may
inform the study of another, the exact nature of a system, its capacity
to adapt to change, and its existence in one or another stable state
depends on its surroundings and history.55
Emergence is used in the context of governance to describe the
networks and solutions that arise from self-organization to respond to
large-scale problems in the absence of any mandate to do so.56 Examples
include watershed organizations that form to restore habitat or cities
that come together to take ambitious action to address climate change,
with no governmental authority requiring either action. The fact that
50. Mônica Cavalcanti Sá de Abreu & Raphael de Jesus Campos de Andrade, Dealing with
Wicked Problems in Socio-ecological Systems Affected by Industrial Disasters: A Framework for
Collaborative and Adaptive Governance, 694 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, Dec. 1, 2019, at 6,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2019.133700 [https://perma.cc/NEG8-R9TG] (PDF download
available at URL provided).
51. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, §§ 4.1.2, 8.2.1 (“C.D. Broad (1887–1971) coined the term
‘emergent properties’ for those properties that emerge at a certain level of complexity but do not
exist at lower levels.”); Brian C. Chaffin & Lance H. Gunderson, Emergence, Institutionalization
and Renewal: Rhythms of Adaptive Governance in Complex Social-Ecological Systems, 165 J. ENV’T
MGMT. 81, 83–84 (2016).
52. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 6.3.3.
53. Id. § 8.3.1.
54. Aristotle is attributed with this observation, although his statement in Metaphysics
translates to “the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something beside the
parts.” ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. VIII, pt. 6 (W.D. Ross trans.) (350 B.C.E.). Kurt Koffka, the
architect of gestalt theory, is also attributed with this statement. See M.R. Harrower-Erickson,
Kurt Koffka: 1886-1941, 55 AM. J. PSYCH. 278 (1942) (discussing the life and works of Kurt Koffka).
55. See LEVIN, supra note 38, at 57–80.
56. Brian C. Chaffin, Hannah Gosnell & Barbara A. Cosens, A Decade of Adaptive Governance
Scholarship: Synthesis and Future Directions, 19 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 3, 2014, at 1–2,
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-06824-190356 [https://perma.cc/X5EG-2FBB] (PDF
download
available at URL provided).
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emergence is context specific renders it impossible to design a
government program for every complex problem.
In governance of complex problems, such contextualization
cautions against panaceas.57 A deep understanding of a complex
problem and its setting, the inclusion of local knowledge and
perspective, and a tailoring of governance to that context are required
yet are impossible to achieve through government programs alone. In
particular, when humans are involved, issues of power and agency
enter into the context, further adding to the complexity challenge
for governance.
(3) Networks. A network is the pattern or structure of
components that are linked across spatial scales.58 Networks mediate
dynamic exchange among the components of a system and can include
the flow of energy, matter, information, ideas, or currency.
Networks have been popularized to describe the selforganization of society through social media, but they are also present
in ecosystems and systems of governance. A classic example of networks
in U.S. government is the relationship between the three branches of
government or between state and federal government. So prevalent are
networks in legal systems that scholars have begun to develop
methodologies to map them.59
(4) Feedbacks. Feedbacks occur when system components
influence each other. Feedbacks are generated by causal loops that
return to the source and provide a critical concept for understanding
system dynamics such as self-regulation and learning.60 Feedback can
be negative or positive. Negative feedback leads to control and stability
(stable air temperature in a modern building is a result of negative
feedbacks, as is the human body temperature). Positive (or selfreinforcing) feedback (such as population growth) may cause a small
change to result in large effects and can lead to rapid transitions in the
57. See Elinor Ostrom, A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. 15181, 15181 (2007) (challenging universal solutions to resource overuse or
destruction and describing more complex methodologies for developing solutions).
58. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 4.1.5.
59. See Mattias Derlén & Johan Lindholm, Goodbye van Gend en Loos, Hello Bosman? Using
Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual CJEU Judgments, 20 EUR. L. REV. 667
(2014) (applying network analysis to legal judgments by the Court of Justice of the European
Union); Marios Koniaris, Ioannis Anagnostopoulos & Yannis Vassiliou, Network Analysis in the
Legal Domain: A Complex Model for European Union Legal Sources, 6 J. COMPLEX NETWORKS 243
(2018) (applying network analysis to EU legal sources).
60. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 5.3.1 (noting that Norbert Wiener, who was credited with
recognizing the causal connections that are integral to feedback loops, also recognized their
importance in social systems (NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS: OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION
IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (1st ed. 1948)); CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 5.3.5 (discussing
self-organization).
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state of a system.61 Positive feedback results in instability, as
illustrated by radioactive decay.
Feedback intentionally occurs in legal systems and political
systems. Scholars have described the structure of checks and balances
among branches of government as creating stabilizing feedback loops.62
Interestingly, perception of governmental action can create a positive
feedback that magnifies the public response to a political action for good
or for bad.63 Knowledge from governance experiments is something
governments could compile, disseminate, and use to distribute
resources to facilitate the spread of successful innovation.
(5) Nonlinearity and tipping points. Nonlinearity refers to
system interactions and behavior that are neither continuous nor linear
(such as progress through similar, successive steps). Nonlinear
relationships can lead to abrupt changes in a system when it reaches a
threshold.64 In popular language, this abrupt change is referred to as a
phase change, regime shift, or tipping point.65 Examples are as simple
as the transition of water from ice to liquid to steam and as complicated
as governmental regime shift in the wake of revolution. The study and
mathematical depiction of complexity illustrates that it may be more
difficult to return to the former state once a threshold is crossed (in fact,
some shifts may be irreversible).66 Empirical studies also suggest that
thresholds may be very difficult to identify until crossed.67
The possibility of nonlinear behavior is of particular importance
in the governance of social-ecological systems facing climate change.
The possibility of surprise from nonlinearity presents challenges for the
structural orientation of governance systems. For example, top-down,
centralized government programs may favor engineering resilience
over ecological resilience and thus be more subject to rapid
transformation. Governance through multiple types and scales of
institutions may foster innovation. Breathing space for adaptation of
environmental systems optimized for key services may be essential to
61. CAPRA & LUISI, supra note 18, § 6.2.2; see also PANARCHY, supra note 35.
62. GEORGE P. RICHARDSON, FEEDBACK THOUGHT IN SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SYSTEMS THEORY
64–66 (1991).
63. Id. at 212.
64. Holling, supra note 20, at 3–6; Gunderson, supra note 40, at 431–32.
65. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE (2000) (as the title suggests, this book describes the “tipping point” of various trends,
at which a small shift in a system leads to abrupt and widespread changes).
66. Scheffer et al., supra note 35, at 593; see also Thresholds Database, RESILIENCE ALL.,
https://www.resalliance.org/thresholds-db (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3QW2498Q] (compiling a directory of thresholds and regime shifts in ecological and linked socialecological systems).
67. See Scheffer et al., supra note 35, at 591 (noting that catastrophic shifts are typically
unannounced and signs of an upcoming change are difficult to obtain).
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avoiding societally undesirable tipping points.68 Capacity to transform
may be essential if tipping points are unavoidable and require erosion
of system resilience.69 The preference of legal and economic systems for
stasis means that government leadership and resources will be
essential in any necessary transformation.70
(6) Cross-scale interactions. As Rittel and Webber recognized
through their reference to “large and interconnected networks of
systems,”71 complex systems are generally nested within a system of
coevolving systems—a system of systems. Zooming in on the global
economy, we find regional economies, such as the United States or the
European Union (“EU”), state economies, such as Idaho or Finland, and
local economies within states. Each level is a complex system, but the
levels also impact one another. Changes in the global economy impact
the regional, state, and local economies. Similarly, the nested lowerlevel economic systems contribute to and bring about the dynamics of
the global economy. Moreover, all these different levels are connected
to various biophysical and social systems, including the law. For
example, the legal system regulates the finance system, but changes in
the finance system may then require changes in the legal system. Thus,
a holistic approach or method is needed to understand the behavior of
a system in its specific context. Understanding of the systems nested
within the system of interest, and those at a higher level than the
system of interest, is needed to appreciate the network effects of
intervening in any one component of the network.
For governance, this nesting of systems could become an avenue
to make room for small-scale innovation while providing stability at
higher levels. A typical example would be to set legally binding goals or
general rules at the federal level and allow a margin of discretion for
state or local level actors in implementing measures to reach the goals.
Nevertheless, the complex emergent properties of nested systems
compound the problem of transferability of solutions.

68. Daniel A. DeCaro, Brian C. Chaffin, Edella Schlager, Ahjond S. Garmestani & J.B. Ruhl,
Theory and Research to Study the Legal and Institutional Foundations of Adaptive Governance, in
PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 269, 273–74.
69. See Brian C. Chaffin, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Lance H. Gunderson, Melinda Harm
Benson, David G. Angeler, Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Barbara Cosens, Robin Kundis Craig,
J.B. Ruhl & Craig R. Allen, Transformative Environmental Governance, 41 ANN. REV. ENV’T &
RES. 399, 417 (2016) (“[The need for] [t]ransformative governance arises . . . when a socialecological regime shift is eminent or the need for a regime shift (e.g., a severely degraded SES) is
apparent to provide for human and ecosystem wellbeing.”).
70. See id. at 410–11 (highlighting the important roles that the law, formal institutions, and
government structures play in transformative governance).
71. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 159.

1704

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:6:1687

(7) Uncertainty. The consequence of self-organization,
emergence, networks, feedback, nonlinear tipping points, and crossscale interactions is the hallmark feature of complex systems—
uncertainty.72 Uncertainty is particularly prevalent in dynamic
systems subject to external disturbances, such as the current
COVID-19 pandemic and unintended consequences related to global
climate change.
Social systems seek stability from governance for reasons
spanning security for investment and the knowledge that society may
live free of conflict.73 Yet this desirable goal of stability produces an
unyielding response to change.74 The understanding that uncertainty
in a complex system is an aspect of emergence reveals the futility of an
approach to governance that maintains the status quo while
uncertainty is reduced through further study. Rather, maintaining the
status quo is itself a management decision with consequences in the
face of change.
From its origins in biology and its development in math and
physics, complexity theory rapidly penetrated other sciences focused on
systems, such as ecology and brain science, as well as social sciences
including economics, management, anthropology, and even law.75 All of
these disciplines study complex systems. Law is charged with managing
other complex systems, including finance, health care, and human
interaction with the environment, and is itself a complex system. 76 We
72. See Holling, supra note 20, at 17–19 (noting the presence of uncertainty in both external
sources of system disturbance and in system response to that disturbance); Gunderson, supra note
40, at 432–34 (noting that unpredictability and uncertainty are inherent in complex
ecological systems).
73. See Robin Kundis Craig, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. Allen, Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold, Hannah Birgé, Daniel A. DeCaro, Alexander K. Fremier, Hannah Gosnell & Edella
Schlager, Balancing Stability and Flexibility in Adaptive Governance: An Analysis of Tools
Available in U.S. Environmental Law, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 2, 2017, at 1 [hereinafter Craig et
al., Balancing Stability and Flexibility], https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-08983-220203 [https://perma.
cc/NF6S-58HC] (PDF download available at URL provided) (addressing the virtues of stability in
governance); Robin Kundis Craig, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Craig R. Allen, Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold, Hannah Birgé, Daniel DeCaro & Hannah Gosnell, Stability and Flexibility in the
Emergence of Adaptive Water Governance, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 167, 167–82
[hereinafter Craig et al., Stability and Flexibility] (same).
74. See, e.g., Lance H. Gunderson, Ahjond Garmestani, Keith W. Rizzardi, J.B. Ruhl & Alfred
Light, Escaping a Rigidity Trap: Governance and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in the
Everglades Social Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 127 (2014) [hereinafter Gunderson et al.,
Escaping a Rigidity Trap] (discussing how the water management system of the Everglades has
changed and adapted over time); Lance Gunderson, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Keith W. Rizzardi, J.B.
Ruhl & Alfred R. Light, Social, Legal, and Ecological Capacity for Adaptation and Transformation
in the Everglades, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 65, 65–82 [hereinafter Gunderson et
al., Social, Legal, and Ecological Capacity] (same).
75. Ruhl & Katz, supra note 45, at 198–99.
76. J.B. Ruhl, Daniel Martin Katz & Michael J. Bommarito II, Harnessing Legal Complexity:
Bring Tools of Complexity Science to Bear on Improving Law, 355 SCIENCE 1377, 1377 (2017).
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make the same observation about governance more broadly—
governance both is a complex system and manages complex human and
coupled social-ecological systems. We will return to the seven features
of complex systems in the context of adaptive governance, but first, it is
important to understand how and why governance evolves.
II. GOVERNANCE TRENDS WITH INCREASING COMPLEXITY
While the current rate of change is unprecedented, democratic
societies have navigated change through transformations in society and
governance in the past. This history is important in identifying patterns
in governance evolution as well as the role of government in periodic
transformations. From a multidisciplinary review of governance
literature: “Governance may be defined as organized efforts to manage
the course of events in a social system.”77 It is considered a broader term
than government, with government forming a subset: “Whereas
government refers to political institutions, governance refers to
processes of rule wherever they occur.”78 Central to all definitions of
governance is the focus on the process of development of formal and
informal rules that “define[] rights and responsibilities of members
facing common social problems.”79 “The term governance encompasses
not only government but the relationship between government and
society, including the means through which private actors, markets,
and even interest-based networks influence policy decisions and selforganize to mediate their own behavior.”80 We turn to this rich
understanding of governance from the policy sciences before seeking
common ground between these insights and the characterization of
similar phenomena by resilience scholars.

77. Burris et al., supra note 10, at 3.
78. BEVIR, GOV. INTRO, supra note 9, at 3; see also BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 17.
For the definition used in the AWG Project see Cosens & Gunderson, supra note 9, at 5
(“Governance refers to the means through which collective goals are chosen, decisions are made,
and action is taken to achieve the chosen goals.” (first citing ROGERS & HALL, supra note 9; then
citing GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 9; and then citing UNITED NATIONS SYS.
TASK TEAM, supra note 9)).
79. Myungsuk Lee, Conceptualizing the New Governance: A New Institution of Social
Coordination 4 (May 3, 2003), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.202.1474
[https://perma.cc/92VH-P378] (PDF download available at URL provided).
80. Cosens & Gunderson, supra note 9, at 5; see also VANDENBERGH & G ILLIGAN, supra note
10 (discussing the rise of private governance in response of the failure of government to address
climate change).
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A. Coevolving Society and Governance
Dorf and Sabel explain major changes in the U.S. federal
government as the reconciliation (“synthesis” in their words) of the two
conflicting views of democracy that Madison saw as imbedded in the
Constitution—that is, that democracy is both deliberative and
calculative.81 Under their framing, this need for reconciliation forces
evolution in government in application to an evolving society. 82 Thus,
this tension imbedded in the Constitution, if reconciled in application
to an increasingly complex society, will strike the appropriate balance
between self-organization and intentional government intervention.
This Article focuses on the need to make room for greater distributed
self-organization in the face of increasing complexity while at the same
time enhancing the capacity of government to facilitate and steer these
efforts in a manner that reflects the public good. In doing so, we find
the review of past transformations in society and governance by Dorf
and Sabel extremely valuable. It reveals patterns in the coevolution of
society and governance and moments of rapid, nonlinear change in
which transformation without revolution took place. 83
The society governed in the initial century of the U.S.
Constitution, similar to other Western democracies of the time, was
largely agrarian. This dominance of local economies and homogeneity
in their pursuit allowed a high level of self-governance.84 In those
circumstances, society had the capacity to be largely self-governing and
thus deliberative in the process of local decisionmaking. Hierarchy
based on land ownership led to varying degrees of inequity in different
democratic systems but also created a private governance structure
with safety nets for its members. Competition among the three
branches of government, among states and the federal government due
81. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998). While the article by Dorf & Sabel focuses on the U.S. experience,
this paper will turn to sources considering a broader geographic scope when analyzing new and
adaptive governance.
82. Id. at 275.
83. Also, constitutions evolve. ALEXANDER SOMEK, THE COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION 1–35
(2014). Somek argues that globally there have been three major phases of constitutional
development: constitutionalism 1.0 (constitution protecting civil liberties and emphasizing the
negative obligations of government); constitutionalism 2.0 (constitution protecting human rights,
such as dignity, and emphasizing the positive obligations of government); and constitutionalism
3.0 (age of pluralism in which constitutional authority is spread among institutions at multiple
levels of governance). Id. at 36–133, 176–243. Constitutionalism 3.0 is in interesting parallel with
societal decisionmaking moving from government to broader understanding of governance. Both
developments describe the diminishing role of government facing complexity.
84. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 276 (noting that the Madisonian synthesis was
premised on the understanding that early American society was locally self-governing with a
limited role for federal government).
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to federalism, and between the two houses of the legislature resulted in
a limited government that leaves space for local self-governance.85
The Industrial Revolution disrupted this local capacity for selfdetermination across Western democracies.86 Economic ties were no
longer local.87 Unrestrained market power by a new form of economic
organization created a working class without the former community
safety net for old age or sickness and with no control over its own
wages.88 The rise of industry also corresponded to widespread
environmental degradation that came about as a result of increasing
agricultural and economic activity, along with increased population
growth.89 In the United States and elsewhere, government intervention
resulted in the vast expansion of technocratic agencies that were
delegated decisionmaking power within legislatively established
bounds.90 Dorf and Sabel argue that the response was entirely
consistent with an increase in societal complexity.91 The use of
bureaucracies with technical expertise to both enable and curb the
power of large economic organizations that crossed local and state
boundaries filled the gap in the capacity of local self-organization to
govern. 92 Attention to process assured fair and uniform application of
rules across vast areas.
By the 1970s, the complexity of social problems and their
context-specific emergence began to exceed the capacity for a
governance system based on uniform process and solution. 93 Indeed,
this trend is precisely the governance challenge that Rittel and Webber
identified in their theory of wicked problems.94 Communities and
individuals were left without solutions for local issues.95 Dorf and Sabel
argue that government did not respond to that complexity.96 Instead, it
vacillated between reforms that would constrain agencies through

85. Id.; see also SOMEK, supra note 83, at 1–9 (describing this as constitutionalism 1.0
protecting civil liberties).
86. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 276.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 276–77.
89. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 9 (2004).
90. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 277.
91. Id.
92. See SOMEK, supra note 83, at 11. One aspect of constitutionalism 2.0 is government
assuming a more paternalistic role in securing rights, such as right to a clean environment, and
starts exerting control over free markets. Id.
93. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 278.
94. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 155–56; see also J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Governing
Wicked Problems, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2020).
95. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 280–81.
96. Id. at 279–82.
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oversight and judicial review97 and reforms that would result in retreat
to the concept of limited government that prevailed during the era of
agrarian economies.98
Government reform, led by the neoliberal movement,
accelerated in the 1980s in many parts of the world and focused on
reducing the role of the state through marketization (i.e., privatization
of public services as well as the use of market features such as
competition and price mechanisms in regulation or the continued public
delivery of services99) and deregulation (lifting of government
regulation of private activity100). These neoliberal reforms began in the
United States with the Reagan Presidency (1981–1989), in the U.K.
with the term of Prime Minister Thatcher (1979–1990),101 and via the
World Bank in that same era in parts of the Global South.102 It was
considered a response to the failures of an unwieldly bureaucracy
caused by increasing diversity in complex problems that exceeded the
capacity of centralized bureaucracy and its uniform process of policy
implementation.103 Bureaucracies were considered to have become
increasingly inefficient at providing public services104 and unresponsive
to the varied demands of citizens.105
This nostalgia for a time of limited government that worked for
a self-governing agrarian society106 failed in the absence of an actual
societal return to those conditions. The reform experiment in the United
States retained the benefits of legal recognition of the corporate form of
organization and corporate personhood and their reach across
jurisdictional boundaries while limiting means for redress of any harm
from their actions.107 This juxtaposition of the old and the new has led
to a perceived loss of legitimacy in government and the electoral
process. Powerful corporate actors have used the relaxation of

97. Id. at 279.
98. Id. at 281–82.
99. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 127–28.
100. Id. at 171–72.
101. Shalanda H. Baker, Adaptive Law in the Anthropocene, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 563,
573 (2015).
102. Id.; BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 129; Managing Development: The Governance
Dimension, WORLD BANK 10, 12, 34, 36 (Aug. 29, 1991), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/884111468134710535/pdf/34899.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2EB-64AL]; CARL J. BAUER,
SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL REFORM 4 (2004) (discussing
the World Bank’s role in promoting neoliberal, free market policies in Latin America).
103. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 278–79.
104. BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 162.
105. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 128–29.
106. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 276, 281.
107. Id. at 280–81.
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regulation to serve their own needs at the expense of others. 108 The
market approach in the Global South compounded the problems of weak
government,109 increased debt, led to unsustainable use of resources,110
and led to the further marginalization of indigenous and poor
communities in the competition for resources.111
While the human exercise of agency, power, and empathy
determines the chosen path, complexity theory informs both the failures
of bureaucracy and of neoliberal reform. By viewing law as itself a
complex system, oversimplified approaches to governance such as
centralized command and control, or wholesale efforts at marketization,
are bound to produce unintended consequences in complex systems that
display self-organization and emergence.112 Viewing governance of a
rapidly changing society as itself a wicked problem highlights the
difficulty of isolating cause and effect in an interconnected system and
thus the impossibility of governance solely by design. 113 Rather than
throw out the beneficial aspects of regulation in certain circumstances
and markets in others or design an entirely new governmental
approach, it is time to take a step back and ask: How is this complex
system of society and governance responding to these problems? What
we see is the emergence of new governance in economic systems in the
United States and the EU in the form of public-private networks,
greater citizen involvement,114 and the emergence of adaptive
governance with similar attributes in environmental governance.115
Both show promise. Both have problems.

108. Burris et al., supra note 10, at 36.
109. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 129.
110. Baker, supra note 101, at 574–77, 582.
111. BAUER, supra note 102, at 6, 92, 116.
112. Ruhl & Katz, supra note 45, at 209.
113. Rittel & Webber, supra note 1, at 165 (identifying the following attribute of wicked
problems: “[e]very wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.”).
114. Note that while some scholars use the term “new governance” as used here to capture the
range of both state-centered and private action to reform governance in the wake of neoliberal
reforms, see, e.g., BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 4, others limit the term to primarily
private action, see, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 10, at 53. In collaboration with legal scholars, the
AWG project views the role of law and government as prevalent even in the latter context in those
states with strong democracy. Thus the AWG project and this Article use the broader
conceptualization of “new governance.” See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 471, 473 (2004) (noting these changes have been observed on both sides of the Atlantic).
115. Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stern, The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302
SCIENCE 1907, 1907–10 (2003).
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B. New Governance
Many of the responses to the real and perceived failures of
marketization and deregulation fall loosely into a category referred to
as “new governance.” Descriptions of their emergence focus on the
presence of two types of new governance approaches: networked
governance and collaborative governance.
Networks describe the connections through which independent
actors coordinate their activities.116 In governance, highly diverse sets
of networks emerge in response to gaps in existing governance and may
appear as purely private or public, as well as public-private networks.117
Networks appear among levels and sectors of government and may
emerge among private organizations to fill the gap in state control as
the globalized economy crosses state lines or local problems become too
context specific for centralized bureaucracies to manage.118
Networks emerged initially as the result of the blending of
markets and bureaucracy. The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s did not
eliminate the prevalence of agencies but shifted aspects of their role to
coordinating or steering a much more diffuse public and private form of
governance.119 This reassertion of state-centered control differs from
the top-down command and control approach. Because private actors
are not subject to the same limits on authority and process as a
regulatory agency, the instruments governments use to “steer”
networked governance are more indirect, including setting the goals or
standards that must be achieved without dictating the manner of
doing so.120

116. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 138.
117. Burris et al., supra note 10, at 13.
118. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 140–41; Burris et al., supra note 10, at 16–17, 19–
20; Peter Drahos & Martin Krygier, Regulation, Institutions and Networks, in REGULATORY
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS AND APPLICATIONS 1, 15–16 (Peter Drahos ed., 2017). For the rise of private
governance to fill the governmental gap in climate change mitigation, see VANDENBERGH &
GILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 3–29; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 217, 243–60 (2015).
119. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 139; BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 162.
120. BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 60–61. In Finland, salient examples of this
approach include Green Deals that are nonlegally binding agreements between the Finnish
government (Ministry of the Environment) and a branch of industry for advancing sustainable
development goals. The Green Deals can be used for complementing and going beyond existing
regulatory requirements on a voluntary basis. Currently, there are three such deals in Finland:
(1) one for decreasing the use of plastic bags in the retail sector; (2) one for decreasing carbon
emissions in the transportation sector; and (3) one for improving oil waste management. Green
Deals, MINISTRY ENV’T, https://www.ym.fi/en-US/Legislation/Green_Deals (last updated Apr. 18,
2019, 10:14 AM) [https://perma.cc/RB3E-LC3S].
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Networked governance may provide greater flexibility than topdown regulatory control and greater stability than markets.121 Yet, this
mix of private actors providing public services outside the reach of
administrative law and the sheer complexity of public-private networks
gives rise to concerns about accountability122 and access.123 The
resulting lack of transparency may lead to unequal leverage over public
decisionmaking,124 with the corresponding need for government to
intervene in order to assure access by those marginalized.125
Collaborative governance is thought to address some of these issues
by involving citizens in general, not merely those organized in
powerful networks.
Collaborative governance reflects the emergent organization of
citizens to address contextual problems not solved through centralized
government action126 and the efforts to increase citizen participation in
government through processes that involve dialogue.127 In contrast to
networks, involvement in collaborative governance is not limited to
private sector groups with sufficient capacity to organize and play an
active role in decisionmaking or delivery of services but includes civil
society in general.128 The move to collaborative governance is driven
both by complexity, and thus the need to bring multiple perspectives
and local knowledge to bear on problems (increasing the chance that
context-specific issues will be addressed and secondary impacts
avoided), and by the need to respond to issues of legitimacy encountered
in marketization and networked governance.129 While some assert that
collaborative governance increases transaction costs, others argue that
the involvement of more actors up front speeds adoption of policies and
avoids costly secondary consequences.130

121. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 140.
122. BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 171; Burris et al., supra note 10, at 15.
123. Burris et al., supra note 10, at 28–29.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 33.
126. Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RSCH. & THEORY 543, 543–71 (2008).
127. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 47 n.5. In Finland, river-basin-specific Water
Visions are good examples of collaborative governance. Water Vision is an emergent process in
which a local government or municipal authority invites—without a direct government mandate—
public and private stakeholders to build trust, discuss shared goals and take voluntary measures
to improve water management, e.g., take measures to restore migratory fish populations. See, e.g.,
Iijoen Vesistövisio, AKORDI, https://akordi.fi/portfolio-item/ii-joen-vesistovisio/ (last visited Sept.
26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K8NN-R7NX].
128. BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 109.
129. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 48.
130. Id. at 48–49.
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The expanding role of private actors in government has led to a
weakening of the role of the state and, at its worst, has “allow[ed]
wealthier groups to seize the levers of governance available in diffuse
systems of collective governance.”131 This in turn alters the power of
traditional state diplomacy to address problems of a global nature.132
These consequences of new governance inform our approach to the role
of government, which must consider how to retain the adaptive capacity
and ability to contextualize exhibited by new governance while
reasserting the role of government in assuring good governance. It
should also be noted that not all the approaches to governance emerging
to fill the gap as society undergoes rapid change are within the reach of
existing law. Globalization of the economy as well as global pandemics
place many activities beyond the reach of current instruments of statecentered governance. Organizations like Al Qaida are considered “dark
networks” of governance.133 Only a modification of the new governance
responses of networks and collaboration within a larger governmental
role have the potential to address the reach of these activities.
The legal scholars and political scientists whose work informs
this article call for a more experimental134 and contextualized135
approach to governance. This exploration of the evolution of governance
also reveals that legal and political science scholars characterize the
current evolution in economic governance (i.e., “new governance”) as a
response to increasing complexity. Many of the attributes are selforganizing and display emergent properties. Dorf and Sabel view this
from the perspective of constitutional governance and call for
“democratic experimentalism” that contemplates a role for government
in facilitating innovation and recognizes that complexity requires an
approach that allows for learning.136 Bevir views this from the
perspective of emerging new governance. His “decentered theory”
recognizes that systems of governance also have emergent properties
and the possibility of following multiple paths to alternative states.
Decentered theory recognizes the complex legacy of history, culture,
and geography in defining a governance pathway.137 It captures the
131. Burris et al., supra note 10, at 41.
132. Id. at 42.
133. Id. at 3–4.
134. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 288.
135. See BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 1 (“Governance is seen as a set of diverse
practices that people are constantly creating and recreating through their concrete activity.
Governance is explained by the narratives that the relevant actors first inherit as historical
traditions and then revise in response to dilemmas.”).
136. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 267.
137. See BEVIR, THEORY GOV., supra note 9, at 1 (“[D]ecentered theory emphasizes the
diversity of governing practices and the importance of historical explanations of these practices.”).
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variance in system behavior not only at a point in time but through time
by acknowledging the role of history.
Together, decentered theory and democratic experimentalism
provide the framework for the role of government within governance.
Viewing democratic experimentalism through the lens of decentered
theory provides a bridge from the approach of Dorf and Sabel, primarily
focused on the structure and function of government, to the empirical
work on adaptive and new governance emerging to address complex
problems. Furthermore, we believe it is no coincidence that new
governance bears a striking resemblance to adaptive governance that
has been observed and described by resilience scholars whose work is
addressed in the following paragraphs. The parallels between new
governance and adaptive governance allow us to draw from a more
complete spectrum of disciplines to identify the appropriate role for
government in the governance of complex problems. 138
C. Emerging Trends in Environmental Governance:
Towards Adaptive Governance
Environmental governance is the subset of governance that
seeks to mediate human interaction with the environment.139 This
Section returns to ecological resilience theory and the corresponding
recognition of its relevance for environmental management. The uptake
of these concepts in social science led to empirical and theoretical work
on the emergence of adaptive governance that occurred coincident with
emergence of new governance and shares many of the same adaptations
to complexity.
Following his mathematical development of resilience theory,
C.S. (Buzz) Holling and colleagues developed additional concepts that
are useful in application to social-ecological systems as heuristics to
illustrate the path dependency of systems. 140 “Panarchy” captures the
degree to which the capacity of a system to adapt or transform is
influenced by or sensitive to changes at smaller and larger scales.141 The
“adaptive cycle” informs the trajectory of a system by recognizing that:
(1) the capacity of a system to sustain growth declines as it matures; (2)
fast and slow processes interact and may foster or erode adaptive
138. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 288.
139. ROGERS & HALL, supra note 9, at 4; GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 9;
UNITED NATIONS SYS. TASK TEAM, supra note 9, at 3–4.
140. C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive
Change, in PANARCHY, supra note 35, at 5–14.
141. See C.S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Garry D. Peterson, Sustainability and
Panarchies, in PANARCHY, supra note 35, at 63.
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capacity; and (3) interactions across scales may stabilize large-scale
systems while providing opportunity for innovation and adaptation at
small scales.142 hese concepts are illustrated by considering why a
community dependent on a variable water supply that maximizes
development during a period of wet years has limited room to adapt and
thus faces scarcity during drought. The panarchy heuristic is also useful
in understanding the pathways for governance intervention when a
system approaches a threshold.143 Thus, an agricultural system
dependent on irrigation may collapse in the face of prolonged drought.
Without external intervention, farmers may suffer or move to urban
areas. In a nested system (i.e., panarchy), however, small-scale
innovation as the threshold approaches, and knowledge and financial
resources from higher levels, may allow the community to reorganize
under new livelihoods or a new approach to farming.
In the mid-1970s, Holling and his colleagues were trying to
apply systems concepts, tools, and models to managed natural resource
systems, such as forestry systems, with managers attempting to control
pest outbreaks in order to maintain a steady supply of wood for
economic stability. They recognized that the nonlinear behavior and
complexity led to deep uncertainties regarding the workings of nature
and effects humans had on ecosystems. Human interventions that had
environmental impacts could not be reliably predicted, or at an extreme,
were inherently unpredictable. Hence, environmental management had
to change from management by objective to seek social goals and stable
outcomes, to management that was more flexible and adaptive to
changing conditions. They called this new approach “adaptive
management.” 144 Adaptive management is an experimental approach
that involves learning by doing. “[U]nlike a traditional trial and error
approach, adaptive management has explicit structure, including
careful elucidation of goals, identification of alternative management
objectives and hypotheses of causation, and procedures for the collection
of data followed by evaluation and reiteration.”145 While adaptive
management has received considerable attention both in scholarship
and agency work,146 its application to landscape-scale systems has been
142. See id.; C.S. Holling and Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in
PANARCHY, supra note 35, at 25.
143. Chaffin & Gunderson, supra note 51, at 83–84.
144. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978);
CARL J. WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
145. Craig R. Allen, Joseph J. Fontaine, Kevin L. Pope & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Adaptive
Management for a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENV’T MGMT. 1339, 1339 (2011).
146. BYRON K. WILLIAMS, ROBERT C. SZARO & CARL D. SHAPIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF THE I NTERIOR,
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE (2009),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/ppa/upload/TechGuide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
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limited,147 except in highly controlled situations.148 In particular, in
situations with multiple competing interests and multiple jurisdictions,
a technocratic implementation of adaptive management fails because it
lacks legitimacy.149 This has led many authors to search for a
governance framework within which adaptive management could be
more effectively implemented.150
Thus, the simplest definition of “adaptive governance” is the
governance needed to implement adaptive management. However,
empirical work aimed at identifying types of governance with high
adaptive capacity quickly moved beyond adaptive governance as simply
the means to implement adaptive management to what is necessary to
manage resilience (i.e., the behavior of complex systems). 151 This
63XT-8DZW]; Niko Soininen & Froukje Maria Platjouw, Resilience and Adaptive Capacity of
Aquatic Environmental Law in the EU, in THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH IN OCEAN PLANNING AND
GOVERNANCE 17 (David Langlet & Rosemary Rayfuse eds., 2019).
147. John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River
Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENV’T L. 1249, 1258–63 (1993)
(applying adaptive management analysis in the salmon conservation context); Kai N. Lee,
Appraising Adaptive Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY, no. 2, Sept. 8, 1999, at 1,
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol3/iss2/art3/
[https://perma.cc/2ABN-DCJP]
(general
discussion of challenges of following an adaptive management approach for “natural resource
management and biodiversity conservation”); Gunderson & Light, supra note 40, at 323–24
(applying adaptive management to Everglades conservation efforts); Gunderson et al., Escaping a
Rigidity Trap, supra note 74, at 149–54 (discussing adaptive governance in the context of
management in the Everglades); Gunderson et al., Social, Legal, and Ecological Capacity, supra
note 74; Nikolaos Voulvoulis, Karl Dominic Arpon & Theordoros Giakoumis, The EU Water
Framework Directive: From Great Expectations to Problems with Implementation, 575 SCI. TOTAL
ENV’T, 358, 358–66 (2017).
148. Karl W. Flessa, Edward P. Glenn, Osvel Hinojosa‐Huerta, Carlos A. de la Parra‐Rentería,
Jorge Ramírez‐Hernández, John C. Schmidt & Francisco A. Zamora‐Arroyo, Flooding the Colorado
River Delta: A Landscape-Scale Experiment, 94 EOS, TRANSACTIONS, AM. GEOPHYSICAL UNION
485, 485–86 (2013); see also Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (presenting a draft administrative law for
adaptive management and noting that it is only appropriate under controlled conditions).
149. Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty: Resilience
Theory and the Columbia River Treaty, 30 U. UTAH J. LAND RES. & ENV’T L. 229, 229–65 (2010)
[hereinafter Cosens, Transboundary]; Barbara A. Cosens, Legitimacy, Adaptation, and Resilience
in Ecosystem Management, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2013, at 1–2 [hereinafter Cosens,
Legitimacy], http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05093-180103 [https://perma.cc/D23V-BQ45] (PDF
download available at URL provided); Lee, supra note 147.
150. See Dietz et al., supra note 115, at 1908–10 (developing the concept of adaptive
governance in complex systems and proposing certain strategies for meeting these requirements);
Carl Folke, Thomas Hahn, Per Olsson & Jon Norberg, Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological
Systems, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 441, 452 (2005) (setting the foundation for much of the
literature on adaptive governance after Dietz et al. coined the term).
151. Folke et al., supra note 150, at 457; Louis Lebel, John M. Anderies, Bruce Campbell, Carl
Folke, Steve Hatfield-Dodds, Terry P. Hughes & James Wilson, Governance and the Capacity to
Manage Resilience in Regional Social-Ecological Systems, 11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2006, at 2,
8, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art19/ [https://perma.cc/D64G-R3WG] (PDF
download available at URL provided); Dave Huitema, Erik Mostert, Wouter Egas, Sabine
Moellenkamp, Claudia Pahl-Wostl & Resul Yalcin, Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the
Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-)Management from a Governance Perspective and
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broader focus is consistent with the recognition that adaptive
management requires the ability to control experiments. 152 In contrast,
most large landscapes are “characterized by competing interests,
jurisdictional complexity, and multiple drivers of change, and thus the
ability to identify single management goals and to control
experimentation is limited.”153 In addition, power structures within and
controlling decisionmaking are not explained by resilience theory. In
fact, agency, power, and empathy may not only change the feedbacks in
social systems in ways that are not analogous to the response of
ecosystems but may be the driving force behind the response of social
systems to change.154 Thus, while it may be one tool to address certain
aspects of wicked problems, adaptive management alone is insufficient.
Importantly, empirical work by social scientists who embraced
resilience theory has begun to describe a new form of governance
emerging in complex settings, including those in which governmental
gaps existed.155
Elinor Ostrom and her lab documented self-organization of
resource-dependent communities from fishing villages to irrigation
districts, finding that even in the absence of regulation, communities
are capable of self-organizing to assure sustainability of the resource.156
Importantly, Ostrom’s work refuted Garret Hardin’s position in his
famous essay, The Tragedy of the Commons,157 that only private
ownership or government regulation could prevent the overuse of
common pool resources.158 After the initial publication in 1990,
Ostrom’s lab continued to study the phenomenon of social selforganization and to develop a framework for the conditions under which
it is likely to emerge.159 She collaborated with Dietz et al. in coining the

Defining a Research Agenda, 14 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2009, https://www.ecology
andsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art26/ [https://perma.cc/RC56-VF7X] (PDF download available at URL
provided); Cosens & Gunderson, supra note 9, at 3–4; Cosens et al., supra note 10, at 4.
152. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 148, at 18, 34.
153. Cosens et al., supra note 10, at 4.
154. Debra J. Davidson, The Applicability of the Concept of Resilience to Social Systems: Some
Sources of Optimism and Nagging Doubts, 23 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 1135, 1143–45 (2010); see Craig,
supra note 26, at Part II (noting that resilience theory does not capture aspects of “social
capriciousness” present in wicked problems).
155. OSTROM, supra note 49, at 15–18.
156. Id. at 58–102.
157. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
158. Locher, supra note 49, at 534. In 2009, Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Economics for this work.
159. Elinor Ostrom, A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological
Systems, 325 SCIENCE 419, 419–22 (2009) (creating a framework to identify variables that affect
self-organization).
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term “adaptive governance” and identifying the conditions under which
robust locally based adaptive governance is possible.160
This work was furthered when the Resilience Alliance (“RA”)
formed in 1999, as “an international, multidisciplinary research
organization that explores the dynamics of social-ecological systems.
RA members collaborate across disciplines to advance the
understanding and practical application of resilience, adaptive
capacity, and transformation of societies and ecosystems in order to
cope with change and support human well-being.”161 This productive
collaboration brought social scientists like Carl Folke and Elinor
Ostrom together with the architects of ecological resilience theory, and
work began on bridging the empirical observation of adaptive
governance with resilience theory.162
Inspiring the approach in this article, Folke et al. “explore the
social
dimension
that
enables
adaptive
ecosystem-based
management”163 while maintaining the nonnormative focus of
ecological resilience theory and turn to social science for insights on how
to manage (rather than achieve) resilience.164 The work of the authors
is empirically based and recognizes that not only do social systems
exhibit behavior of complex adaptive systems165 but that socialecological systems are intertwined in ways that include feedback across
systems and result in emergent properties not explained through the
study of each in isolation.166 They describe collaborative networks and
bridging organizations across polycentric governmental and
nongovernmental entities that provide a setting in which learning can
take place at both the local and policy-setting levels and adaptive
management can find social acceptance.167 With devolution of

160. Dietz et al., supra note 115, at 1907 n.28.
161. About, RESILIENCE ALL., https://www.resalliance.org/about (last visited Sept. 26, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3SAZ-QEFE]. For an interesting study analyzing why the Resilience Alliance has
been such a successful collaboration, see John N. Parker & Ugo Corte, Placing Collaborative
Circles in Strategic Action Fields: Explaining Differences Between Highly Creative Groups, 35
SOCIO. THEORY 261, 276–79 (2017), for a discussion of how the use of nontraditional venues, among
other factors, by the Resilience Alliance contributed to its success, see John N. Parker & Edward
J. Hackett, Hot Spots and Hot Moments in Scientific Collaborations and Social Movements, 77 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 21 (2012), for a discussion of how emotion and moments of intense collaborative action
shaped the Resilience Alliance.
162. Folke et al., supra note 150, at 443–47, 452–53.
163. Id. at 442.
164. Id. at 441, 443.
165. Id. at 443.
166. Id. (citing NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR
COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE (Fikret Berkes, Johan Colding & Carl Folke eds., 2003)).
167. Id. at 444, 447–54.
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management to the scale of the problem, feedback from management
actions can be detected.168
In the context of water governance, Huitema et al.169 seek to
bridge the literature on “adaptive (co)management” (a term proponents
of adaptive management began using when it was clear that landscapeor basin-scale implementation required a more collaborative and
political process than the technocratic implementation of science-based
experimentation) and the emerging literature on governance and
adaptive governance, focusing in particular on the literature on
institutions (e.g., the Ostrom school of thought).170 In doing so, they find
common ground among various disciplinary articles on adaptive
comanagement and governance first from the scholarship alone and
then by looking for evidence in water governance.171 They identify many
of the same attributes, noting that public participation also increases
innovation, transparency, and democracy.172 Their observation
identifies one of the defining factors of the scale of adaptive governance
by noting that in water systems adaptive governance emerges at the
bioregional (i.e., problem) scale.173
Chaffin et al. provided a review of environmental adaptive
governance literature in 2014.174 Their work is an outgrowth of the
efforts of the RA to engage in dialogue with people in the policy sciences
and law,175 but they also review literature from scholars of emerging
trends in community-based management who applied the term
168. Id. at 451.
169. Huitema et al., supra note 151, at 1.
170. Id. at 1–2.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 5–7.
173. Id. at 9–11.
174. Chaffin et al., supra note 56, at 1–2.
175. The first law and resilience conference, Law for Social-Ecological Resilience International
and Transdisciplinary Conference, STOCKHOLM UNIV., http://www.juridicum.su.se/resilience/ (last
visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/72JV-DRDH] [hereinafter Law and Resilience Conference],
at the University of Stockholm resulted in: a two-part special issue of Ecology and Society, LAW
AND SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, PART I: C ONTRIBUTIONS FROM RESILIENCE 2011, in 18
ECOLOGY
AND
SOC’Y
(SPECIAL
ISSUE)
(2013),
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
issues/view.php?sf=78 [https://perma.cc/R2PY-VXKF] [hereinafter SPECIAL ISSUE PART I] (PDF
download available at URL provided); LAW AND SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, PART II:
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM LAW FOR SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE SYMPOSIUM, in 18 ECOLOGY AND
SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2013), https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/view.php/feature/98
[https://perma.cc/JHU3-PNKK] [hereinafter SPECIAL ISSUE PART II] (PDF download available at
URL provided); a panel bringing together ecologists and legal scholars at the Resilience 2011
conference, Resilience 2011 – Resilience, Innovation and Sustainability: Navigating the
Complexities of Global Change, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., https://sustainability.asu.edu/events/
rsvp/resilience-2011/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X25M-DJTA] [hereinafter
Resilience Conference], at Arizona State University; and the book SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE
AND LAW (Ahjond S. Garmestani & Craig R. Allen eds., 2014).
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adaptive governance to cases where managing uncertainty had become
critical.176 They identify emergent processes that arise through
networks across multiple sectors and jurisdictions to achieve dialogue
and action at the scale of the problem.177
As with the scholars of new governance, adaptive governance
scholars had begun to identify problems of good governance associated
with private collective action. This focus on the emergent, or bottom-up,
aspects of adaptive governance would require additional disciplinary
input from the policy disciplines to understand the larger governance
frameworks in which these processes might emerge.
Lebel et al. further the exercise of bridging resilience to the
social and political sciences not only by analyzing the type of
governance needed to manage resilience but by considering what is
necessary for society to accept a more flexible form of governance. By
bringing in other disciplinary perspectives, they emphasize that “we not
only need to ask: The resilience of what, to what? We must also ask: For
whom?”178 They draw from the literature on adaptive governance to
inform how to manage resilience, and from the literature on “good
governance”179 that considers aspects of legitimacy180 and as a result,
come closer to bridging this literature to governance scholarship in the
legal and political sciences.
In addition to describing similar attributes of adaptive
governance, Lebel et al. use case studies to illustrate the integration of
good governance and the capacity to manage resilience. They find some
evidence that participation and deliberation build the necessary trust
and networks to facilitate self-organization and that deliberation
facilitates the learning necessary to adapt to change.181 In addition,
they find some evidence that polycentric, multilayered governance not
only improves the fit of governance to the scale of the problem but
facilitates the use of local knowledge, increasing the chance of early
warning of the impacts of change, and that accountability and checks
on power may enhance the capacity of marginalized groups to adapt,
ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits.182

176. Chaffin et al., supra note 56, at 6–8.
177. Id. at 7.
178. Lebel et al., supra note 151, at 1. The authors recognize that the writers of that article
use the normative definition of resilience. To avoid that, we would substitute the term
“adaptive capacity.”
179. Id. at 4.
180. Id.; see also Cosens, Legitimacy, supra note 149, at 5–8.
181. Lebel et al., supra note 151, at 5–8.
182. Id. at 8–11.
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Contemporaneously with the development of a shared
understanding of adaptive governance, scholars of environmental
governance began to bridge their work with the broader scholarship on
governance. This led to recognition of common attributes between new
governance and adaptive governance.183 These scholars discuss the rise
of new governance as a result of increasing interdependency and
interaction as well as the desire for a greater citizen voice in natural
resources management.184 The work of Lockwood et al. stands out in
this interdisciplinary effort.
Although they do not use the term “adaptive governance,”
Lockwood et al. draw on the new governance literature as well as the
literature on development, sustainability, and adaptive governance to
develop eight principles for natural resource management and
governance. Similar to the work of Lebel et al., this interdisciplinary
approach results in principles that reflect an understanding of both
society and ecosystems and the need for governance capable of
addressing problems “characterized by complexity, uncertainty,
interdependency, and deficiencies in resources, expertise, and
knowledge.”185 Their eight principles include aspects of good governance
and adaptive capacity. They are: (1) legitimacy; (2) transparency; (3)
accountability; (4) inclusiveness; (5) fairness; (6) integration; (7)
capability; and (8) adaptability.186
The literature on adaptive governance developed by scholars in
more and more disciplines began describing similar phenomena,
identifying those components relevant within their disciplines.
Consistent with theories of new governance, the result is not a list of
criteria that make up adaptive governance but an ever-broadening
picture of the various processes of governance that increase the capacity
of society to manage change and uncertainty in complex systems. Also
consistent with new governance theory, these processes are bottom-up
and emerge through networks and collaboration that arise at the scale
of the particular problem and by their nature are contextualized not
only to account for the nuances of the problem in that particular space
but to account for the variance in history and culture of the society

183. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 79, at 14 (arguing for use of IAD from the work of Nobel Laureate
Elinor Ostrom framework to analyze new governance); Karkkainen, supra note 114, at 494–95
(proposing use of adaptive management principles in new governance scholarship); Michael
Lockwood, Julie Davidson, Allan Curtis, Elaine Stratford & Rod Griffith, Governance Principles
for Natural Resource Management, 23 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 986, 986 (2010) (examining ability of new
governance to handle uncertainties).
184. Lockwood et al., supra note 183, at 988.
185. Id. at 990.
186. Id. at 991–97.
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affected.187 However, despite the recognition of the social context,
including the need for legitimacy by Lebel et al. and Lockwood et al., a
major gap remained in whether and how government (and therefore
law) plays a role in adaptive governance. We turn in Part III to the
ongoing efforts of legal scholars of adaptive governance to close
that gap.
III. ADAPTIVE LAW: ENABLING GOVERNANCE FOR COMPLEX
SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
Legal scholars brought to the table the importance of
government and law in removing barriers to and opening windows of
opportunity for adaptive governance, facilitating and participating in
adaptive governance, and assuring its legitimacy.188 The authors
participated in these efforts by undertaking a systematic study of the
role of law in adaptive governance in the United States and a follow-up
process to these concepts to the EU in general and Finland in
particular.189 These projects build on previous work to identify aspects
of adaptive governance that are emergent under the right conditions
and the aspects that must be intentional in the structure, capacity, and
process of government defined by law if adaptive governance
is to emerge, succeed, have legitimacy, and keep pace with
accelerating change.
Informing the role of formal law and government in managing
wicked problems is an interdisciplinary exercise and requires the
integration of aspects of the governance literature, including new
187. Folke et al., supra note 150, at 447–50.
188. Cosens, Transboundary, supra note 149, at 238–41. See SPECIAL ISSUE PART I, supra note
175; SPECIAL ISSUE PART II, supra note 175; SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW, supra note
175, at 1–14.
189. For background, see the authors’ note. See also Barbara A. Cosens, Robin K. Craig, Shana
Lee Hirsch, Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Melinda H. Benson, Daniel A. DeCaro, Ahjond S.
Garmestani, Hannah Gosnell, J.B. Ruhl & Edella Schlager, The Role of Law in Adaptive
Governance, 22 ECOLOGY AND SOC’Y, no. 1, 2017, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/
iss1/art30/ [https://perma.cc/K36T-HPQX] [hereinafter Cosens et al., Role of Law] (PDF download
available at URL provided); Barbara A. Cosens, Robin Kundis Craig, Shana Hirsch, Craig Anthony
Arold, Melinda Harm Benson, Daniel DeCaro, Ahjond S. Garmestani, Hannah Gosnell, J.B. Ruhl
& Edella Schlager, Legal Pathways to Adaptive Governance in Water Basins in North America and
Australia, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 151–66 [hereinafter Cosens et al., Legal
Pathways] (discussing the evolution of law to facilitate adaptive governance in basin studies);
Barbara Cosens, Lance Gunderson, & Brian Chaffin, Introduction: The Adaptive Water
Governance Project: Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional Socio-ecological Water
Systems Facing a Changing Climate, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Cosens et al.,
Introduction to AWG Project] (examining role of law in adaptive governance of water systems);
Ruhl & Salzman (2020), supra note 94. For the EU-Finnish part, the project is still underway while
writing this article, see Frontpage, BLUEADAPT, https://blueadapt.fi/en/frontpage/ (last visited
Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/Q6LW-8TGU], for updates on and descriptions of the EU project.
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governance and democratic experimentalism, as well as an
understanding of the behavior of complex systems. To this end, Part I
established how complex systems function and concluded with seven
common features of complex systems in the literature on systems
thinking, complexity theory, and ecological resilience that may be
relevant to governance in a time of accelerating change: (1) selforganization; (2) emergence; (3) networks; (4) feedback; (5) nonlinearity;
(6) cross scale interactions; and (7) uncertainty. Part II elaborated how
these features had influenced the development of new governance
theories in general and adaptive governance theory in particular. The
following Section seeks to: (1) situate formal law and government in
adaptive governance literature; and (2) consider key criteria for a legal
framework facilitating adaptive governance.
A. Situating Law Within the Adaptive Governance Literature
Returning to the work of Elinor Ostrom, Locher (an
environmental historian) finds it no coincidence that Ostrom’s work on
community self-organization and its influence in both policing in the
United States and development work globally arose at a time of
increasing frustration with large, top-down government.190 Because the
Ostrom line of scholarship leading to identification of adaptive
governance was based on empirical work, it supports the notion that
the rise in private and public-private networks may be catalyzed by the
need to fill a governance (i.e., governmental) gap. It is also important to
note that while much of Ostrom’s work focuses on the self-governing
nature of local adaptive governance, the criteria for its robust
development articulated in Dietz et al. is almost entirely composed of
actions that may be facilitated by law and that require actions and
networks at governmental levels above the local. The criteria from Dietz
et al. include: congruence of rules with ecological conditions; clear
boundaries and defined rights; enforced sanctions; mechanisms for
dispute resolution; institutional variety; accountability; analytical
deliberation/participation; and nesting.191 The rise of private
governance as a form of self-organization to fill gaps in environmental
governance192 requires, at a minimum, attention to government to

190. Locher, supra note 49, at 557.
191. Dietz et al., supra note 115, at fig.3.
192. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 10, at 3–5, 8–12 (arguing a concerted effort
by private actors to effort to reduce emissions can be used to gain compliance with the Paris climate
change agreement in the interim while governmental bodies overcome gridlock); Vandenbergh &
Gilligan, supra note 118 (discussing private governance actions to address rising carbon emissions
in presence of governmental gridlock).
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remove barriers, prevent capture by more powerful interests, and
facilitate more rapid response.
Thus, the importance of government is implicitly acknowledged
but not the focus of the approach of institutionalists. In contrast,
democratic experimentalism based on legal scholarship focuses almost
entirely on the role of government within a constitutional framework to
navigate increasing complexity and uncertainty, only touching on the
emergent role of self-organization and private governance it seeks
to foster.193
Governance, new governance, and decentered theory from
political science look at both sides of the governance puzzle—that is,
what is happening in society and how government is evolving in
response. Thus, scholars like Mark Bevir provide us with a lens to
bridge the empirically based scholarship on the bottom-up emergence
of self-organized networks, private governance, and collaborative
governance, and the legal scholarship focused on the governmental
response. Both aspects are necessary to achieve timely
adaptive governance.194
The early work on adaptive governance revealed that selforganization, emergence that is context specific, and networks are all
present, and in fact, defining attributes of adaptive governance. What
scholars did not ask was: What must the legal/governmental component
of adaptive governance look like to speed up its emergence and allow it
to succeed? Recognizing the gap between adaptive governance
literature and legal scholarship, the Stockholm Resilience Centre and
Faculty of Law at Stockholm University brought legal and resilience
scholars together in 2010.195 Conversations in Stockholm led the RA to
dedicate one session at their 2011 gathering to law and resilience.196
These combined gatherings resulted in two collections of publications
identifying the role law plays in erecting barriers to adaptive
governance and management due to its focus on maintaining social
stability and setting the stage for further work to consider law as a
means to manage change while protecting the social need
for stability.197

193. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 311–23.
194. Cosens et al., Role of Law, supra note 189; Cosens et al., Legal Pathways, supra note 189,
at 160–61.
195. Law and Resilience Conference, supra note 175. Having just published one of the early
articles on law and adaptive governance, Cosens, Transboundary, supra note 149, lead author
Cosens was privileged to be a plenary speaker at this gathering.
196. Resilience Conference, supra note 175.
197. See SPECIAL ISSUE PART I, supra note 175; SPECIAL ISSUE PART II, supra note 175.
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Building on that work, the Adaptive Water Governance (“AWG”)
relied on both theory and empiricism. It used case studies of
social-ecological management of North American water basins—a
wicked problem if ever there was one—to create a cross-disciplinary
dialogue among ecologists and legal scholars199 searching for any
empirical support for the hypothesis that adaptive governance is
emerging in heavily managed systems and that government and law
play a role.200 The project specifically asked: Does law present barriers
to adaptive governance? May law play a role in triggering, facilitating,
and institutionalizing adaptive governance? And if so, what is the role
of formal legal institutions in adaptive governance? 201 The answers are:
yes; yes; and, in keeping with decentered theory, it depends on
the context.
Law presents barriers to adaptive governance by favoring
stability over flexibility202 and by providing for judicial review in
advance of experimentation.203 It may also inhibit innovation in private
governance through the application of one-size-fits-all solutions. Yet
complexity and resilience theories caution that the rigid maintenance
of stability in the face of unprecedented rates of change could itself be
destabilizing. Furthermore, the framing of wicked problems cautions
that
high-level
planning
and
implementation
lacks
the
contextualization needed to address issues such as climate change
mitigation or adaptation to its impacts on the environment. Nesting of
Project198

198. For background, see the authors’ footnote.
199. See Cosens et al., Introduction to AWG Project, supra note 189.
200. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Hannah Gosnell, Melinda H. Benson & Robin K. Craig,
Cross-Interdisciplinary Insights into Adaptive Governance and Resilience, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y,
no. 4, 2017, at 1, https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss4/art14/ [https://perma.cc/Q7GLGXWN] (PDF download available at URL provided); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Hannah
Gosnell, Melinda Harm Benson & Robin Kundis Craig, Cross-Basin Patterns of Systemic-Change
Drivers and Adaptive Governance Features, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 205, 205–
28; Cosens et al., Role of Law, supra note 189; Cosens et al., Legal Pathways, supra note 189, at
153; Craig et al., Balancing Stability and Flexibility, supra note 73; Craig et al., Stability and
Flexibility, supra note 73, at 168–69; Daniel A. DeCaro, Brian C. Chaffin, Edella Schlager, Ahjond
S. Garmestani & J.B. Ruhl, Theory and Research to Study the Legal and Institutional Foundations
of Adaptive Governance, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 269, 269–88 [hereinafter
DeCaro et al., Theory and Research]; Daniel A. DeCaro, Brian C. Chaffin, Edella Schlager, Ahjond
S. Garmestani & J.B. Ruhl, Legal and Institutional Foundations of Adaptive Environmental
Governance, 22 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 1, 2017, at 1 [hereinafter DeCaro et al., Legal and
Institutional Foundations], https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol22/iss1/art32/ [https://perma.cc/
WPT8-85VS] (PDF download available at URL provided).
201. See Cosens et al., Role of Law, supra note 189.
202. Craig et al., Balancing Stability and Flexibility, supra note 73; Craig et al., Stability and
Flexibility, supra note 73, at 169.
203. Gunderson et al., Escaping a Rigidity Trap, supra note 74, at 153, 155; Gunderson et al.,
Social, Legal, and Ecological Capacity, supra note 74, at 72–76, 78; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81,
at 463–64.
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governance capable of local innovation within higher levels of
government that set goals can provide flexibility within a stable
framework.204 Facilitation of private governance across international
boundaries can accelerate response to global issues. Dorf and Sabel’s
work informs the AWG Project by considering how to foster democratic
experimentalism within a constitutional framework. They provide an
approach to break the gridlock of judicial review, suggesting review
focused on whether the posed implementation measure has a
reasonable relation to the goal; whether implementation is achieving
outcomes that are trending toward the specified goal; and whether
there is any violation of individual rights.205 In addition, they would
replace process-based review with substantive judicial review to
address instances of alleged corruption associated with lack of inclusion
in collaborative governance206 and oversight to reduce the potential for
corruption in private governance.
In keeping with the governance scholarship that recognizes the
emergence of networks, private governance, and collaboration as a
response to complexity and the failure of government to manage it
effectively, adaptive governance appears to emerge in response to a
social or biophysical disturbance. Thus, the greater extremes of flood
and drought occurring as society goes down the path of climate change
are resulting in the emergence of processes networked across sectors
and levels and among public and private actors to allow response at the
scale of the problem.207 But law also creates disturbance. In several of
the basins studied by the AWG project, the application of regulatory law
to complex systems (e.g., environmental law) created such unwieldy
results that adaptive governance emerged in the search for better
solutions.208 The studies also demonstrated frequent failure in

204. Craig et al., Balancing Stability and Flexibility, supra note 73; Cosens et al., Legal
Pathways, supra note 189, at 157–58; Cosens et al., Role of Law, supra note 189; Cosens et al.,
Introduction, supra note 189, at 11.
205. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 288, 398–400.
206. See id. at 399–400 (explaining that judicial review would examine the size of the gap
between actors’ actions and their stated purposes to determine whether they are truly pursuing
their goals).
207. See Barbara Cosens, Water Law Reform in the Face of Climate Change: Learning from
Drought in Australia and the Western United States, 33 ENV’T & PLAN. L.J. 372, 386–87 (2016)
(discussing the need for increased adaptability in regulation in light of a rising likelihood of
extreme flooding or drought).
208. See Brian C. Chaffin, Robin Kundis Craig & Hannah Gosnell, Resilience, Adaptation, and
Transformation in the Klamath River Basin Social-Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 162–
63 (2014) [hereinafter Chaffin et al., Resilience] (stating that federal, state, and local law and
institutions has worsened the environmental impact in the Klamath River Basin); Brian C.
Chaffin, Hannah Gosnell & Robin K. Craig, The Emergence of Adaptive Governance in the Klamath
River Basin, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 83, 84–86 [hereinafter Chaffin et al.,
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governmental
facilitation
of
adaptive
governance
and
institutionalization of results, leading to the conclusion that legal
authority is needed in these areas.209
The role of formal institutions in adaptive governance
encompasses many of the activities contemplated by Dorf and Sabel for
democratic experimentalism, which in turn provides the constitutional
justification for authorizing facilitation of adaptive governance. Thus,
at higher levels of government, agencies provide resources,210 pool
knowledge, and coordinate across actors seeking to innovate in the face
of similar problems. Drawing from the adaptive governance
scholarship, levels of government within or at the scale of the problem
participate through cross-sector, cross-level, and public-private
networks focused on innovation within the local to global context.
Drawing from both the adaptive governance and broader governance
literature, the increasing role for private actors through networks or
collaboration raises concerns with legitimacy (including accountability
and transparency), equity, and justice. Once again, both participating
and higher levels of government have a role to play in assuring
legitimacy and access as well as in building local capacity within
marginalized groups to participate. The judiciary must provide checks
on injustice and inequity in access as well as in uneven distribution of
benefits, but timing must be carefully tailored to avoid gridlock.

Klamath River Basin] (describing the frustration of stakeholders with conflicting federal statutes
and mandates on resource distribution and conservation of water basins).
209. See Cosens et al., Role of Law, supra note 189 (providing a framework for legal reform);
Cosens et al., Legal Pathways, supra note 189, at 158–59 (“[I]n the context of adaptive capacity,
there is currently a lack of legal mechanisms at any level that allow for alternatives to traditional
environmental enforcement—alternatives that could enhance local innovation while maintaining
stability and accountability toward achieving the goals that traditional enforcement mechanisms
seek to achieve.”); DeCaro et al., Theory and Research, supra note 200, at 278 (“In addition to
reluctance to devolve responsibility and inadequate legal authority to self-organize . . . insufficient
administrative and technical support are major sources of adaptive and cooperative failures in
environmental governance.”); DeCaro et al., Legal and Institutional Foundations, supra note 200,
at 1 (“One of the biggest challenges for . . . adaptive governance is to develop formal legal
frameworks—legal principles, laws, and regulatory mechanisms—that support such adaptation
without stifling stakeholders’ inherent self-organizing potential or the emergent properties of
adaptation itself.”).
210. While beyond the scope of this article, the work of economist Mariana Mazzucato
recognizing the critical role of government in stimulating innovation for the good of society and a
sustainable economy is important on the issue of the role of government. See MARIANA MAZZUCATO,
THE VALUE OF EVERYTHING: MAKING AND TAKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018) [hereinafter
MAZZUCATO, VALUE]; RETHINKING CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND
INCLUSIVE GROWTH (Michael Jacobs & Mariana Mazzucato eds., 2016); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE (rev. ed. 2015) [hereinafter MAZZUCATO, ENTREPRENEURIAL].
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B. Unpacking the Role of Formal Law and
Government in Adaptive Governance
Adaptive governance is an emergent, self-organizing
phenomenon, but it is clear that government participates, facilitates,
and, at times, gets in the way of its success. The new insights from
multiple disciplines and understanding of the emergent attributes of
adaptive governance that adaptive law must foster set the stage for
unpacking the legal/governmental (or intentional) role in adaptive
governance and identifying how and when it can speed the process. The
role of formal law and government plays out in four categories.
Government structure. Building on the work of Dorf and Sabel,
this category focuses on the level and type of authority assigned to
agencies and the use of federal/state relations as contemplated by
cooperative federalism in the United States or subsidiarity in the EU to
balance stability and flexibility and to assure the authority to network
across governmental sectors, levels, and with private entities working
within an established constitutional framework. To balance stability
and flexibility, the authority to innovate and adaptively manage must
be delegated to the level of government closest to the problem while
nesting that innovation in a higher level of government with clear,
legally binding goals and standards.211 Administrative law and the
substantive authority for agencies at all levels of government to
network across sectors and with private entities to provide integrated
coordination and response 212 must place boundaries on the processes to
assure accountability and inclusion.
Government’s role in capacity building. The benefits of
distributed innovation still leave considerable room for a governmental
role in catalyzing change and ensuring inclusion in the process of
change. Climate change mitigation and adaptation are among the most
wicked problems facing humankind. Progress on either front is
211. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 381–82 (discussing the effectiveness of local
governmental management in regulating use of toxics under Massachuesetts state law); Craig et
al., Balancing Stability and Flexibility, supra note 73 (discussing the tension between the role of
law in providing stability and the need for flexibility when managing systems undergoing change);
Craig et al., Stability and Flexibility, supra note 73, at 174–75 (discussing the mechanisms
available to balance stability and flexibility in government); Soininen & Platjouw, supra note 146,
at 36–41 (discussing the effectiveness of EU conservation efforts given delegation of
implementation decisions to individual member states, while reserving enforcement power for
the Commission).
212. See Cosens et al., Role of Law, supra note 189 (discussing the need for agency authority
to network across sectors and with private actors while maintaining legitimacy, accountability,
equity and justice); Cosens et al., Legal Pathways, supra note 189, at 153 (“[I]n trading stable
governmental control for innovative adaptive governance, the engagement of private actors in
governance should not come at the expense of legitimacy, accountability, equity, and justice.”).
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dangerously behind the rate of change.213 The situation calls for the
modern equivalent of the race to the moon—that is, governmental
leadership in focusing, catalyzing, and accelerating innovation.214
Government assistance should provide avenues for pooling and
disseminating data and capacity building in the form of both funding
and knowledge.
Capacity building is also essential to address the concern that
greater private participation in governance and the devolution of
implementation to local levels may lead to capture by more powerful
interests, marginalization of certain populations, and simply local
problems in the form of lack of time, money and knowledge to act, and
participation fatigue.215 Bevir notes that “[a]dvocates of more
participatory democracy are often acutely aware that different citizens
possess different resources for participating. Hence they often attend
carefully to process issues about who participates in what ways and
under what circumstances. So, for example, they might advocate state
support for under-represented groups.”216 In keeping with the focus on
the historical context of decentered theory, marginalization may be of
particular concern for populations suffering the legacy effects of past
discrimination (e.g., Indigenous peoples in the Pacific Northwest and
Scandinavia and African Americans in the many parts of the United
States).217 Judicial review on inclusion is essential to assure equitable
participatory processes.
213. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 118, at 234 (“The depth of the political barriers,
however, suggests that adoption and implementation of a carbon price at the national and
international levels over the next decade is a long shot.”); see, e.g., David W. Stahle, Anthropogenic
Megadrought: Human-Driven Climate Warming Worsens an Otherwise Moderate Drought, 368
SCIENCE 238, 238–39 (2020) (explaining that Southwestern North America recently underwent its
second-driest spell in twelve hundred years).
214. See, e.g., MAZZUCATO, VALUE, supra note 210, at 244 (“[Public institutions] must think
big and play a full part in the great transformations to come, squaring up to the issues of climate
change, ageing populations and the need for twenty-first-century infrastructure and innovation.”);
RETHINKING CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND I NCLUSIVE GROWTH,
supra note 210, at 34 (“[I]nnovation also needs well-funded public research and development
institutions and strong industrial policies. These need to be directed across the entire innovation
chain, not only in the classic ‘public good’ area of basic science.”); MAZZUCATO, ENTREPRENEURIAL,
supra note 210, at 27 (“[W]e have instead is a case for a targeted, proactive, entrepreneurial State,
one able to take risks and create a highly networked system of actors that harness the best of the
private sector for the national good . . . the State acting as lead investor and catalyst . . . .”).
215. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 29; see Cosens, Legitimacy, supra note 149.
216. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 29.
217. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Olivia Odom Green, Daniel DeCaro, Alexandra Chase
& Jennifer-Grace Ewa, The Social-Ecological Resilience of an Eastern Urban-Suburban
Watershed: The Anacostia River Basin, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 29, 68 (2014) (“[R]estoration projects in
Washington D.C. may actually be a continuation of earlier economic and environmental injustices
thinly veiled behind the rhetoric of environmental sustainability. . . . African American
stakeholders continue to be marginalized and exploited under the guise of the Anacosta Riverfron
Initiative.”); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Olivia Odom Green, Daniel DeCaro, Alexandra Chase
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Governmental adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity in
government requires that (1) governmental agencies have the authority
to (a) implement adaptive management,218 adaptive planning,219 and
resilience assessment,220 (b) the resources to monitor current change
and produce modeled knowledge of future change, and (c) the authority
to change course if the data, models or the changes in networked,
collaborative, or private governance indicate a need to do so; and (2) the
ability of law and policy to adapt—that is, adaptive law.221 In a nested
system of government, the level closest to the problem must have
flexibility in implementation with public participation as the means to
ensure legitimacy in the exercise of that flexibility but no discretion to
adjust the goals or standards other than the political process at a higher
level of government. The executive (agency) branch at the level
establishing the law or goals (state or federal) must not have the
discretion to interfere with innovation in implementation beyond
assuring a relation to the goal and absence of corruption. This level,
however, requires the authority to adjust the policy guiding
implementation within a degree of authorized flexibility (i.e., adaptive
law). This nested process reflects a broader scope of flexibility at higher
and higher levels but also greater thresholds reflecting feedback of

& Jennifer-Grace Ewa, Resilience of the Anacostia River Basin: Institutional, Social, and
Ecological Dynamics, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 33, 33 (“[M]ajor drivers of regime
shifts from presettlement to the present are . . . patterns of structural inequality, oppression,
discrimination, and movements to seek social and environmental justice . . . .”); Cosens & Fremier,
supra note 21, at 113 (“[T]he cultural importance of salmon to human inhabitants of the Basin
during the Pre-Contact Era and the devastating impacts on that culture in the Post-Contact and
Dam Building Eras . . . remain as an added layer of complexity in those subsequent eras . . . .”);
Barbara Cosens & Alex Fremier, Social-Ecological Resilience in the Columbia River Basin: The
Role of Law and Governance, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY, supra note 9, at 47 (“[D]ams are a major
factor in the decline of populations of salmon and steelhead species that are critical to the culture
of Indigenous peoples.”).
218. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 144;
Gunderson & Light, supra note 40 at 328–29 (describing the problems associated with not allowing
entities (including governmental agencies) to make decisions based on an evolving understanding
of the problem or the circumstances); Craig & Ruhl, supra note 148, at 10 (developing a model
administrative rule for adaptive management).
219. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Watershed Planning and Climate Change, 5
ENV’T & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 417, 440–49 (2010) (describing the general characteristic and factors
of adaptive planning).
220. Wayfinder: A Resilience Guide for Navigating Towards Sustainable Futures, WAYFINDER,
https://wayfinder.earth (last visited Sept. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/FFG2-2KHS].
221. See Ruhl & Katz, supra note 45, at 208 (“Law itself is a complex adaptive system, and it
necessarily influences and is influenced by the systems it is intended to regulate or manage.”);
Ruhl et al., supra note 76, at 1377 (“Efforts to integrate CAS approaches to regulated systems may
flounder if complex adaptive characteristics of the legal system itself are not taken into account.”).
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information from multiple sources before adjustment is made. Scholars
describe this type of process as triple loop learning.222 Adaptive
management and innovation in implementation represents the inner
loop in which feedback from monitoring allows adjustment of
management measures, feedback from multiple efforts to innovate in
implementation feeds back to allow adjustment in goals and policy
(double loop learning), and feedback from political efforts to adjust
policy and goals allows revisiting of the underlying beliefs and values
that led to the legislation (triple loop learning).223
Government steering: process and oversight. As the role of
private stakeholders in governance increases with mounting
complexity, government is essential to assure good governance.224
Twentieth-century bureaucracies gained legitimacy by basing decisions
on science, but the degree of scientific uncertainty associated with
increasing complexity has eroded trust in science-based
decisionmaking. Irreducible uncertainty is often resolved through
value-based judgements that can gain legitimacy only through open,
transparent, and participatory processes. Thus, a critical role for
government in adaptive governance is to provide oversight on the
process for lower-level public-private actions and judicial review in
cases of alleged corruption.225 In addition, the point of judicial review,
while remaining important on the front end of major projects, should
not be used to create gridlock through a battle of experts faced with
uncertainty. Judicial review of agency decisionmaking under the U.S.
Administrative Procedure Act can gridlock efforts to solve complex
problems.226 As recommended by Dorf and Sabel, shifting the focus of
review to back-end review of progress toward goals will allow
adaptation in the face of uncertainty to proceed.227 Democratic
experimentalism contemplates review based on the tie between the
remedy and the goal, outcomes, and violation of individual rights. 228 It
replaces review based on agency process with review of corruption
involving inclusion in networked and collaborative governance.229

222. See Claudia Pahl-Wostl, A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Adaptive Capacity and
Multi-level Learning Processes in Resource Governance Regimes, 19 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE 354,
354 (2009).
223. See id. at 358–59 (2009).
224. BEVIR, KEY CONCEPTS, supra note 9, at 92–96.
225. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 81, at 399.
226. Id. at 439, 443.
227. Id. at 288, 399–400, 403.
228. Id. at 288, 398–400.
229. Id. at 399.
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Government process must also provide an avenue for
institutionalization of collaborative solutions. Because adaptive
governance emerges at the problem scale following a disturbance, no
authorizing legislation exists. The tendency of society and its elected
officials to lose interest when the crisis wanes leaves those who devoted
years to developing collaborative solutions without the means to
implement them.230 A role for higher-level government agencies may be
to provide a conduit for review of collaborative solutions to ensure
legitimacy, inclusion, and relation to problem and a springboard for
grant funding or legislation to institutionalize the solution.
Finally, it is critical to re-emphasize that adaptive governance,
even in its most generalized definition, is not a panacea. Building on
the AWG Project’s work, AWG 2.0 231 explored the question of: When is
government facilitation of adaptive governance appropriate? Coming
full circle to the discussion of complexity in Part I, the simplest answer
is that it is appropriate in situations of complexity and particularly
appropriate to maintain key attributes of good governance in emergent
adaptive governance efforts responding to wicked problems. In this
context, government provides a toolbox for maintaining the efficacy of
governance by assuring that environmental policy has a chance to reach
the set goals in a feasible timeframe while adhering to good governance.
CONCLUSION
The interdisciplinary exercise of turning to complexity science
and political science to develop a deeper understanding of what types of
governance are needed for society to navigate accelerating change
provides a view of the role of government and law in governance
innovations already emerging and proving successful. The potential for
nonlinear behavior in complex systems ranging from nature to
economies, and the high level of uncertainty associated with when and
how it might occur, calls for governance in which those who govern are
actively engaged in learning and adjustment. Even the laws under
which they govern must be adaptive. In the face of accelerating change,
leaving adaptive governance to emergent processes without the reform
needed to bring government in line with its emergence will be too little,

230. See, e.g., Chaffin et al., Resilience, supra note 208, at 191 (questioning whether solutions
devised in response to a crisis could continue to work without being institutionalized); Chaffin et
al., Klamath River Basin, supra note 208, at 93–96 (noting the failure to implement agreements
regarding the Klamath River Basin after years of negotiation).
231. For background see the authors’ footnote.
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too late. Only if the law itself evolves as “adaptive law” will it keep pace
with accelerating change and help society navigate these changes. In
short, society has become “too complex, diverse, and particular[ized] for
centralized, top-down governance to manage.”232 Our era of modern
wicked problems requires an adaptive governance approach.

232. Burris et al., supra note 10, at 6.

